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Understanding Exclusion of the CISG: A New 
Paradigm of Determining Party Intent 
WILLIAM P. JOHNSON†
INTRODUCTION
The village market of old has become a global market 
today. The products we use or consume on a daily basis are 
produced all over the world. Asparagus grown in Peru, 
coffee beans harvested in Guatemala, shoes made in Italy, 
and Japanese automobiles are all readily available to 
consumers throughout the United States. Moreover, U.S. 
companieseven small U.S. companieshave their 
products manufactured in foreign jurisdictions where labor 
is cheap and the necessary raw materials are plentiful. And 
those U.S. companies who do manufacture their products in 
the United States nevertheless often obtain their parts, 
components, raw materials, and supplies from sources 
located outside the United States. In 2009 alone, the total 
value of imports into the United States of all merchandise
from computers, mobile phones, and Malbec wine to capital 
equipment, heavy machinery, and oil and gaswas a 
staggering $1,559,624,813,477.00, more than one and a half 
trillion dollars.1
While the enormous volume of imports into the United 
States suggests that U.S. buyers must have a nearly 
insatiable appetite for foreignproduced merchandise, U.S. 
sellers certainly desire to get their piece of the foreign pie as 
 Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law. B.A., 
University of Minnesota J.D., University of Michigan Law School. The author is 
grateful to Jan Stone for her invaluable assistance, and to Joshua P. Fershee 
and Michael B. Lopez for taking time to review and provide helpful comments 
regarding earlier drafts of this article. The author is especially indebted to Chad 
M. Oldfather for his very helpful remarks and advice. 
 1. See 2009 Imports from World of NAICS Total All Merchandise, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, http://tse.export.gov/TSE/ 
TSEHome.aspx (Click on National Trade Data then click Global Patterns of 
U.S. Merchandise Trade under Product click Imports then click Go in the 
blue bar click View Data—Text Only) (last visited Oct. 29, 2010). That 
staggering amount was actually down from the preceding four years. See id. 
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well by selling U.S.produced merchandise in foreign 
markets. In fact, the total value of exports out of the United 
States of all merchandise in 2009 was 
$1,056,042,963,028.00, more than one trillion dollars.2 As 
barriers to trade continue to fall or shrink, trillions of 
dollars worth of goods will continue to flow across 
international borders to and from all corners of the planet. 
Side by side with this sleek, sophisticated global 
marketplace are complex bodies of law governing the 
transactions that allow the goods to flow, and those bodies 
of law are fraught with peril for the unsuspecting and the 
uninitiated: peril for U.S. lawyers who are not familiar with 
these laws that seem to emerge from the international ether 
as disputes erupt from their clients crossborder 
arrangements peril for their unsuspecting clients who price 
their goods based on assumptions that are grounded in U.S. 
law and U.S. experience but that ring hollow in 
international transactions and peril for U.S. courts charged 
with the arduous task of rendering decisions in crossborder 
disputes draped with a tangled web of U.S. law, U.S. 
regulations, foreign law, foreign regulations, and 
international law. 
One increasingly important body of law that governs 
certain international sale of goods transactions is the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG).3 The CISG is an 
international treaty that has been ratified by the United 
States and is part of U.S. law. It automatically applies to 
certain sale of goods transactions. But when it applies or 
more specifically how it can be excluded has befuddled U.S. 
courts for the CISGs entire history.
One source of confusion has been how to understand the 
effect of a choiceoflaw clause when such a clause is 
included in the underlying international contract. By way of 
example, in American Biophysics, a recent decision by a 
 2. See 2009 Exports from World of NAICS Total All Merchandise, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, http://tse.export.gov/TSE/ 
TSEHome.aspx (Click on National Trade Data then click Global Patterns of 
U.S. Merchandise Trade under Product click Exports then click Go in the 
blue bar click View Data—Text Only) (last visited Oct. 29, 2010). 
 3. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 989 (1983), 1489 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter CISG]. 
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federal court, the underlying written contract that led to the 
dispute included a choiceoflaw clause providing that the 
parties agreement was to be construed and enforced in 
accordance with the laws of the state of Rhode Island.”4 The 
contract was silent on the CISG. The court concluded that 
the choiceoflaw clause was sufficient to exclude application 
of the CISG.5 That conclusion was incorrect. It simply is not 
the case that a choiceoflaw clause by itself has the effect of 
excluding application of the CISG. 
Nevertheless, there is a widespread and growing body of 
U.S. jurisprudence propagating imprecise and incorrect 
analysis of the CISG and its effective exclusion. Recently, a 
federal court in California carelessly stated that “[t]he CISG 
governs contracts for the sale of goods between parties 
whose places of business are in different nations, if the 
nations are Contracting States, unless the subject contract 
contains a choiceoflaw provision.”6 A clear understanding 
of the proper role of a choiceoflaw clause in the analysis of 
exclusion of the CISG has therefore been elusive. Moreover, 
even those courts who have carefully analyzed the role of a 
choiceoflaw clause have nevertheless often leapt to the 
erroneous conclusion that exclusion of the CISG must 
always be express. 
Perhaps an even more difficult issue—virtually no U.S. 
court has been able to temporarily suspend its traditional 
notions of contract enforcement and interpretation to 
engage in the specific kind of analysis that is required by 
the CISG when determining whether parties to a contract 
that would be governed by the CISG intended to exclude its 
application. Specifically, even when there is a written 
contract with contents that suggest that the parties did not 
intend to exclude application of the CISG, the CISG 
requires courts to consider evidence outside the four corners 
of the written contract that could show that the parties 
nevertheless did intend to exclude application of the CISG.7
 4. Am. Biophysics Corp. v. Dubois Marine Specialties, 411 F. Supp. 2d 61, 
6264 (D.R.I. 2006). 
 5. Id. at 63. 
 6. Golden Valley Grape Juice & Wine, LLC v. Centrisys Corp., No. CV F 09
1424 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 347897, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2010) (emphasis 
added). 
 7. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 8. 
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This is an exercise that is squarely outside the American 
legal imagination and is likely to be culturally difficult for 
courts to embrace. 
In the U.S. legal tradition, the statute of frauds requires 
certain agreements to be evidenced by a writing in order to 
be enforceable. But under the CISG, there is no 
requirement for agreements to be concluded in or evidenced 
by writing. On the contrary, under the CISG, contracts and 
their terms may be proved by any means, including by 
witnesses.8
Similarly, the parol evidence rule in the U.S. legal 
tradition gives written agreements and their contents a 
kind of primacy with respect to determining the intent of 
the parties. If there is a written agreement, then the parol 
evidence rule makes it difficult or impossible to introduce 
evidence of the parties’ intent from outside the four corners 
of that agreement. Under the CISG, by contrast, courts are 
called upon to consider “all relevant circumstances of the 
case including the negotiations, any practices which the 
parties have established between themselves, usages and 
any subsequent conduct of the parties” to determine the 
parties’ intent.9 This exercise is anathema in the U.S. legal 
tradition. 
These U.S. concepts, and the underlying emphasis on 
putting a final agreement into writing and deferring to that 
written agreement, are simply assumed by many U.S. 
practitioners and courts. The CISG requires a different 
approach, reflecting a different legal philosophy that tells 
us, whether correctly or incorrectly, that written 
agreements should be viewed with some skepticism. And if 
the parties’ actual intent—which may be contrary to the 
objective manifestation of intent evidenced by the writing—
can be determined, then the actual intent prevails over a 
contrary objective intent under the CISG.10
But U.S. courts have not recognized their obligation to 
engage in this kind of analysis when determining whether 
or not the parties to a written agreement that would be 
governed by the CISG intended to exclude the CISG. That 
failure can lead to misapplication of the supreme law of the 
 8. Id. art. 11. 
 9. Id. art. 8(3). 
 10. Id. art. 8. 
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land, thereby eroding the rule of law established by the U.S. 
Constitution. A haphazard approach to the analysis of 
application and exclusion of the CISG also seriously 
undermines the ability of businesspersons to engage in 
international business transactions by making impossible 
their already difficult task of identifying performance 
obligations implied by law, remedies made available at law, 
and allocations of risk and responsibility established as 
defaults under the law. Misunderstanding and inconsistent 
application of potentially applicable law make it impossible 
to determine ex ante which body of law the court will choose 
to provide the answers to the relevant questions. 
This Article seeks to bring understanding where there 
is misunderstanding regarding effective exclusion of the 
CISG, including with respect to (i) the role that a choiceof
law clause ought to play in the analsyis and (ii) the 
obligation under the CISG to consider extrinsic evidence to 
determine the parties’ actual intent. To achieve that goal, 
this Article primarily analyzes four related but distinct 
items: (1) the text of the CISG itself, (2) the travaux 
préparatoires, or drafting history, of the CISG, (3) the 
American Biophysics decision and the five cases cited as 
authority by the American Biophysics court to support its 
incorrect conclusion, and (4) illustrative reasoning of U.S. 
courts that have engaged in analysis, some sound and some 
faulty, of a variety of other issues under the CISG. 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE CISG 
A.   Adoption and Ratification 
The CISG is an international treaty aimed at providing 
uniform rules to govern contracts for the international sale 
of goods in order to, among other things, remove legal 
barriers in and promote development of international trade, 
an important element in the promotion of friendly relations 
among countries.11 A draft of the CISG was prepared by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”), and a diplomatic conference of 
plenipotentiaries consisting of representatives of sixtytwo 
independent states, including the United States, was 
 11. Id. pmbl. 
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convened in 1980 to consider the draft.12 The CISG was 
adopted at the conference on April 10, 1980, and it was 
opened for signature on April 11, 1980.13 The CISG was 
signed on behalf of the United States in 1981, and the U.S. 
Senate ratified the CISG in 1986.14 The CISG entered into 
force on January 1, 1988, in accordance with Article 99, 
Section 1 of the CISG after ten countries, including the 
United States, had deposited with the United Nations their 
respective instruments of ratification of the CISG.15
B. Contracts Governed by the CISG 
Subject to certain exclusions, the CISG automatically 
applies to contracts for the sale of goods between parties 
whose “places of business” are in different countries16 when 
 12. United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 10—Apr. 11, 1980, Final Act, ¶¶ 13, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.97/18 (Apr. 11, 1980) [hereinafter Final Act], reprinted in United 
Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Official 
Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19, at 17677 (1991) [hereinafter Official 
Records] see also 1 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods—Explanatory Note by UNCITRAL Secretary xxxixxl (1980). 
 13. Final Act, supra note 12, ¶ 13, reprinted in Official Records, supra note 
12, at 17677. 
 14. See Dep’t of State Pub. Notice 1004, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262 (Mar. 2. 1987) see 
also United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the 
Secretary General, Chapter X: International Trade and Development, United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Apr. 11, 
1980), Status (last updated Jan. 11, 2010), available at http://treaties.un.org/ 
doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20X/X10.en.pdf [hereinafter 
CISG Status]. 
 15. “This Convention enters into force . . . on the first day of the month 
following the expiration of twelve months after the date of deposit of the tenth 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession . . . .” CISG, supra
note 3, art. 99(1). 
 16. Because companies engaging in international business often have more 
than one place of business, sometimes in different countries, one threshold 
question is how to identify which of each party’s places of business is relevant. 
The CISG provides some rules for determining the answer to that question. To 
identify the relevant places of business, neither the nationality of the parties 
nor the civil or commercial character of the parties or contract are to be taken 
into consideration. Id. art. 1(3). If a party has more than one place of business, 
then the place of business that is relevant for determining whether the CISG is 
applicable is the place of business that has the “closest relationship to the 
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the countries are “Contracting States,” or parties to the 
CISG.17 In the typical crossborder sale of goods transaction, 
when the parties know the goods are crossing an 
international border, the CISG will usually govern the 
transaction, if the parties’ places of business that are most 
directly involved with the transaction are in countries that 
have ratified the CISG. Because there are currently 
seventysix parties to the CISG,18 including most of the 
major trading partners of the United States, the CISG is 
potentially relevant for a very large volume of international 
trade. 
C. Sales Contracts Not Governed by the CISG 
Certain sales of goods are expressly excluded from 
application of the CISG, however. The CISG does not apply 
to sales of goods when the goods are purchased for personal, 
family, or household use (unless the seller did not know and 
ought not have known at any time prior to or at the 
conclusion of the contract that the goods were purchased for 
such use), and does not apply to sales of ships, vessels, 
hovercraft, or aircraft. All such sales are expressly excluded 
from the scope of the CISG.19 Additionally, the CISG does 
contract and its performance.” Id. art. 10(a). But whether the parties “have their 
places of business in different States is to be disregarded whenever this fact 
does not appear either from the contract or from any dealings between, or from 
information disclosed by, the parties at any time before or at the conclusion of 
the contract.” Id. art. 1(2). 
 17. Id. art. 1(1)(a). The CISG also applies to contracts of sale of goods 
between parties whose places of business are in different countries even when 
the countries are not Contracting States, if the “rules of private international 
law [would] lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State.” Id. art. 
1(1)(b). However, the United States declared when it ratified the CISG that the 
United States would not be bound by paragraph 1(b) of Article 1, a declaration 
that Article 95 of the CISG specifically contemplates. Article 1(1)(b) is therefore 
inapplicable in the United States. See CISG Status, supra note 14, at 4. Finally, 
the term “Contracting States” refers to signatory countries that have ratified, 
accepted, or approved the CISG and nonsignatory countries that have acceded 
to the CISG. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 91. 
 18. See CISG Status, supra note 14, at 1. 
 19. CISG, supra note 3, art. 2(a), (e). In that respect, the scope of the CISG is 
narrower than that of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter 
UCC], which generally applies to all transactions in goods. See U.C.C. § 2102 
(2002). The UCC defines “goods” quite broadly and without significant carve
outs:  
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not apply to sales of goods when the sales are conducted in 
certain ways. This includes sales by auction and sales on 
execution or otherwise by authority of law, as well as sales 
of stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable 
instruments or money, and electricity.20 Finally, the CISG 
does not apply to certain mixed contracts for the sale of 
goods and services, including contracts for the supply of 
goods when the “party who orders the goods undertakes to 
supply a substantial part of the materials necessary for 
such manufacture or production” of the goods, and contracts 
in which the “preponderant part of the obligations of the 
party who furnishes the goods consists in the supply of 
labour or other services.”21
II. EXCLUDING APPLICATION OF THE CISG 
While there are numerous exclusions under the CISG, it 
nevertheless will apply to many international sales of goods 
when the parties have their places of business in different 
countries and those countries are parties to the CISG. 
However, even when the CISG would apply to a particular 
contract, the CISG permits the parties to the contract to 
choose to exclude application of the CISG.22 The challenge is 
knowing how to understand and apply the provisions of the 
CISG that allow its exclusion—that is, what, if anything, 
are the parties required to do in order to exclude application 
of the CISG? And what are the parties permitted (but not 
“Goods” means all things (including specially manufactured goods) 
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale 
other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment 
securities (Article 8) and things in action. “Goods” also includes the 
unborn young of animals and growing crops and other identified things 
attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be severed 
from realty (Section 2107). 
Id. § 2105(1). Article 2 of the UCC has been adopted throughout the United 
States, other than by the State of Louisiana, and Article 2 of the UCC is 
therefore the primary domestic sales law in the United States. See Uniform 
Commercial Code Locator, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL—LEGAL 
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html#a2 (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 20. CISG, supra note 3, art. 2(b)(d), (f).  
 21. Id. art. 3. 
 22. Id. art. 6. 
2011] UNDERSTANDING CISG EXCLUSION 221
necessarily required) to do in order to exclude application of 
the CISG? 
A.  Confusing the Means of Exclusion 
The challenge of understanding and applying the CISG 
has led to apparent confusion regarding its effective 
exclusion. The confusion has arisen in part due to a 
misunderstanding by some U.S. courts of the relationship 
under the U.S. Constitution between the CISG and 
applicable state law. The confusion has arisen in part due to 
a lack of careful analysis by some U.S. courts of the text of 
the CISG and virtually no analysis by any U.S. court of the 
travaux préparatoires of the CISG.23 This has been 
exacerbated by a bevy of imprecise statements of law in 
dicta by a relatively large number of U.S. courts. And all of 
the foregoing has led to incorrect conclusions by U.S. courts 
that the CISG did not apply when the CISG should have 
been the applicable body of law.
B. The Text of the CISG and the Travaux Préparatoires
Article 6, the article that specifically provides for 
exclusion of the CISG, offers little guidance regarding how 
parties to contracts that would be governed by the CISG are 
specifically to exclude its application. Article 6 simply 
provides that “[t]he parties may exclude the application of 
this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or 
vary the effect of any of its provisions.”24 For that reason, it 
 23. A treaty’s drafting history is relevant to confirm the text, context, object, 
and purpose of the treaty, and to resolve ambiguity, as well as to prevent a 
manifestly absurd or unjust result. See Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, arts. 31(1), 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340. U.S. courts in 
particular are willing to use a treaty’s travaux préparatoires to interpret the 
treaty. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 325 reporters’ n.1 (1987) (“United States courts, accustomed to 
analyzing legislative materials, have not been hesitant to resort to travaux 
préparatoires.”).
 24. CISG, supra note 3, art. 6. Article 12 of the CISG provides:  
Any provision of article 11, article 29 or Part II of this Convention that 
allows a contract of sale or its modification or termination by 
agreement or any offer, acceptance or other indication of intention to be 
made in any form other than in writing does not apply where any party 
has his place of business in a Contracting State which has made a 
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is not surprising that courts encounter difficulties when 
analyzing exclusion of the CISG. 
The potential for difficulty in understanding how to 
apply Article 6 was recognized by some of the 
plenipotentiaries who participated in the conference that 
was convened to consider the draft text of the CISG 
prepared by UNCITRAL. For example, Miss O’Flynn of the 
United Kingdom “considered that . . . the existing text of 
[Article 6] was open to more than one interpretation.”25 And 
Mr. Plunkett of Ireland “said that the existing text of 
[Article 6] could be interpreted in different ways.”26 As well, 
there was a view held by some that it would be helpful to 
clarify how parties to a contract for the sale of goods that 
would be governed by the CISG could exclude application of 
the CISG. In the opinion of Mr. Reishofer of Austria, for 
example, “it should be specified how parties might exclude 
application of the Convention or derogate from any of its 
provisions.”27 And several amendments to Article 6, 
discussed in Part II.C.ii, infra, were proposed in an 
apparent effort to add clarity and certainty.28 But each was 
rejected or withdrawn.29
declaration under article 96 of this Convention. The parties may not 
derogate from or vary the effect of this article. 
Id. art. 12.  
 25. Summary Records of the First Committee, 4th Meeting, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.97/C.1/SR.4, (Mar. 13, 1980), [hereinafter Summary Records—4th 
Meeting], reprinted in Official Records, supra note 12, at 250. In the draft of the 
CISG considered by the conference, Article 6 of the CISG was submitted as 
Article 5. The final version of the text of that article as adopted by the 
conference remained unchanged from the version presented in the UNCITRAL 
draft, other than the numbering of the article, which was changed to Article 6. 
All references in the conference documents to the relevant article are therefore 
to Article 5. To avoid confusion, all references in this article to the relevant 
article are to Article 6, as it is numbered in the CISG as adopted. 
 26. Id. ¶ 21. 
 27. Id. ¶ 14. 
 28. “Amendments were submitted to [Article 6] by the United Kingdom 
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.8), Canada (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.10), India (A/CONF.97/ 
C.1/L.30), German Democratic Republic (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.32), Belgium 
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.41), Pakistan (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.45) and Italy (A/CONF.97/ 
C.1/L.58).” United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 8—Apr. 11, 1980, Report of the First Committee, 
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C. Misunderstanding the Effect of a ChoiceofLaw Clause 
When parties to a sale of goods contract take the time to 
memorialize their agreement in writing, those parties will 
sometimes include in their written agreement an express 
provision purporting specifically to exclude application of 
the CISG.30 Under normal circumstances, it should be 
uncontroversial for a court to give effect to such a provision 
as an express, objective manifestation of the parties’ actual 
intent.31 However, written agreements are often silent with 
respect to the application of the CISG. This may be so even 
when the parties have included an express choiceoflaw 
clause purporting to choose the laws of a particular 
jurisdiction to govern the agreement. When the parties 
include a choiceoflaw clause, if the jurisdiction whose law 
is selected by the choiceoflaw clause is a state within the 
United States or is a country that is a party to the CISG, 
then such a choiceoflaw clause generally should not by 
itself have the effect of excluding the CISG when the CISG 
is otherwise applicable. This is so because the CISG is the 
law of the selected jurisdiction. And for jurisdictions within 
the United States, this is so as a matter of U.S. 
constitutional law. 
1. The Role of U.S. Constitutional Law. The CISG is a 
treaty that was signed by the executive on behalf of the 
United States and was ratified by the U.S. Senate, all in 
accordance with Article II of the U.S. Constitution.32 The 
art. 5, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/11, (Apr. 7, 1980) [hereinafter Report of the 
First Committee], reprinted in Official Records, supra note 12, at 85. 
 29. Id. ¶¶ 58. 
 30. After identifying the body of law that the parties intend to govern their 
agreement, the parties might include a clause that looks something like the 
following, for example: “NEITHER THIS AGREEMENT NOR ANY SALE OF 
GOODS MADE BY SELLER TO BUYER DURING THE TERM OF THIS 
AGREEMENT WILL BE GOVERNED BY THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF 
GOODS, THE APPLICATION OF WHICH IS HEREBY EXCLUDED BY THE 
PARTIES.”
 31. This will not necessarily always be the case, however, as discussed in 
Part VII. 
 32. Article II establishes the socalled treaty power: “[The President] shall 
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .” U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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CISG is therefore a treaty that was made under the 
authority of the United States. Under the U.S. Constitution, 
all treaties made under the authority of the United States 
are the supreme law of the land.33 The CISG is therefore 
part of the supreme law of the United States. Moreover, the 
CISG is a selfexecuting treaty.34 Because it is self
executing, the CISG requires no implementing legislation in 
order to become law within the United States it 
automatically became law within the United States (and 
part of the supreme law of the land) upon its entry into 
force.35
 33. See id. art. VI. Article VI provides in relevant part: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
Id. see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, § 111(1) (International law and 
international agreements of the United States are law of the United States and 
supreme over the law of the several States.).
 34. See Letter of Submittal from George P. Schultz, U.S. Secy of State, to 
Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of Am. (Aug. 30, 1983), in S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 989, at vi (1983) [hereinafter Letter of Submittal] (The 
Convention is subject to ratification by signatory states (Article 91(2)), but is 
selfexecuting and thus requires no federal implementing legislation to come 
into force throughout the United States.) see also Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. 
v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2005) ([The CISG is] 
a selfexecuting agreement between the United States and other signatories) 
Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027 (2d Cir. 1995) ([The 
CISG is] a selfexecuting agreement between the United States and other 
signatories). Several U.S. District Courts have recognized that the CISG is a 
selfexecuting treaty. See, e.g., Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., 
No. 4:09cv00318 SWW, 2009 WL 5181854, at *35 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009) 
Forestal Guarani, S.A. v. Daros Intl, Inc., Civ. Action No. 034821 (JAG), 2008 
WL 4560701, at *2 n.4 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 613 F.3d 
395, 396 (3d Cir. 2010) Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Group, 
L.L.C., Civ. No. 08762 (DSD/SRN), 2008 WL 2690287, at *1 n.1 (D. Minn. July 
1, 2008), vacated, 613 F.3d 345 (3d Cir. 2010) Sky Cast, Inc. v. Global Direct 
Distribution, LLC, Civ. Action No. 07161JBT, 2008 WL 754734, at *4 (E.D. Ky. 
Mar. 18, 2008) Am. Mint LLC v. GOSoftware, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1:05CV650, 
2006 WL 42090, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2006) Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Intl 
Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 35. See Letter of Submittal, supra note 34, at vi see also Whitney v. 
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 
(1829) RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, § 111(3). 
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This uncontroversial proposition has been recognized by 
U.S. courts. In reversing a district courts grant of summary 
judgment, the Ninth Circuit stated that, because the 
President submitted the [CISG] to the Senate, which 
ratified it . . . there is no doubt that the [CISG] is valid and 
binding federal law.36
As part of the supreme law of the land, treaties made 
under the authority of the United States are binding on 
individual states.37 And such treaties preempt state law.38
Indeed, and perhaps even more important for this analysis, 
treaties made under the authority of the United States are
state law.39
As a consequence, a choiceoflaw clause expressly 
choosing the laws of the State of New Yorkor of any other 
jurisdiction within the United Statesalso chooses the 
CISG, if the CISG is applicable to the contract. This is so 
because the CISG is part of the law of the State of New 
 36. Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabaté USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528, 530 
(9th Cir. 2003) (citing Dept of State Pub. Notice 1004, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262 (Mar. 
2, 1987) Letter of Transmittal from President Reagan to the Senate of the U.S. 
(Sept. 21, 1983), in S. Treaty Doc. No. 989, at iii (1983)) see also Valero Mktg. 
& Supply Co. v. Greeni Oy, 373 F. Supp. 2d 475, 479 n.7 (D.N.J. 2005), rev’d on 
other grounds, 242 F. Appx 840, 845 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 37. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236 (1795) (holding that a treaty 
cannot be the supreme law of the land if any act of a state legislature stands in 
its way). In another decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held: 
International law is a part of our law and as such is the law of all 
States of the Union, but it is a part of our law for the application of its 
own principles, and these are concerned with international rights and 
duties and not with domestic rights and duties. 
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 7273 (1941) (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 
U.S. 677 (1900)), reh’g denied, 313 U.S. 599 (1941). 
 38. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, § 111(1) & cmt. D (1987). Some U.S. 
courts have recognized the preemptive force specifically of the CISG. See, e.g., 
Forestal Guarani, 2008 WL 4560701, at *2 n.4 ([T]he CISG, a treaty of the 
United States, preempts state contract law and common law, to the extent that 
those causes of action fall within the scope of the CISG.) see also Valero Mktg. 
& Supply Co., 373 F. Supp. 2d at 479 n.7 Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel 
Prods., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 880, 884 (N.D. Ill. 2002) Asante Techs., Inc. v. 
PMCSierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 115152 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
 39. See Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 490 (1880) (It must always be 
borne in mind that the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States are 
as much a part of the law of every State as its own local laws and Constitution. 
This is a fundamental principle in our system of complex national polity.).
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York and of every other state and territory within the 
United States. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution therefore compels application of the CISG by 
U.S. courts when the CISG is applicable by its terms, 
including when the parties to a transaction have included 
an express choiceoflaw clause choosing the laws of a 
particular state within the United States but have not 
excluded the CISG under Article 6 of the CISG. 
A U.S. court, therefore, improperly usurps the role of 
the executive branch, acting with the advice and consent of 
the U.S. Senate, in the exercise of the Article II treaty 
power when a U.S. court ignores or misapplies an Article II 
treaty duly ratified by the United States. When the court, 
whether intentionally or not, usurps the role of the 
executive branch in its exercise of the treaty power, it 
undermines the separation of powers established by the 
U.S. Constitution.40
2. ChoiceofLaw Clauses and the Travaux 
Préparatoires. Of course, the counterargument is that a 
U.S. court could conclude that a choiceoflaw clause 
choosing the laws of a particular jurisdiction within the 
United States should be understood under Article 6 of the 
CISG to show intent to exclude application of the CISG. 
That is, even though the objective understanding of the 
choiceoflaw clause is that it chooses the CISG when it 
chooses the law of a party to the CISG, perhaps the drafters 
of the CISG intended an express choiceoflaw clause to 
have the effect of showing an implicit intent to exclude the 
CISG nevertheless. A careful review of the travaux 
préparatoires shows that that is not the case. 
In fact, there was a small minority of representatives 
who took the view that inclusion in a contract of an express 
choiceoflaw clause should have the automatic effect of 
excluding application of the CISG. Two amendments were 
 40. An example of unnecessary and undesirable undermining of the 
constitutional separation of powers can be seen in a stray comment in Filanto, 
S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In that case, 
which is one of the early decisions of a U.S. court engaging in analysis of the 
CISG, the court displayed a flash of parochialism in conducting a battleofthe
forms analysis. See id. at 1238. The court, in considering a UCC argument, 
indicated that, as previously noted, the UCC did not apply in that case 
because the State Department undertook to fix something that was not broken 
by helping to create the [CISG]. Id.
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proposed that would have changed Article 6 to provide that 
a choiceoflaw clause would have that effect.41 But the 
proposed amendments were overwhelmingly rejected.42
One of the two amendments was proposed by the 
Canada delegation.43 The Canada delegation proposed 
revising Article 6 to add a second paragraph as follows: A 
provision in the contract that the contract shall be governed 
by the law of the particular State shall be deemed sufficient 
to exclude the application of this Convention even where the 
law of the State incorporates the provisions of the 
Convention.44 In other words, if the amendment proposed 
by the Canada delegation had been adopted, inclusion of 
any choiceoflaw clause not specifically selecting the CISG 
would have had the effect of excluding the CISG. But an 
overwhelming majority of the representatives who 
participated in the consideration of Article 6 unequivocally 
rejected the proposed amendment and the concept 
underlying it.45
Not surprisingly, the rejection of the proposed 
amendment was based in part on the principle that the 
CISG, upon ratification by a country, becomes part of the 
national laws of that country. According to Mr. Plantard of 
France, when a State had the Convention ratified by its 
Parliament, it decided by the same action to incorporate the 
rules into its legal system.46 Similarly, Mr. Shafik of Egypt 
said that the provisions of the Convention were 
incorporated in the national law of a contracting State.47
Ultimately, of more than forty delegates participating in the 
meetings of the First Committee, the conference committee 
charged with considering Article 6, only three delegates 
 41. Report of the First Committee, supra note 28, ¶¶ 3(ii), (v), reprinted in
Official Records, supra note 12, at 8586. 
 42. See id. ¶ 6. 
 43. See id. ¶ 3(ii) (citing U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.1/L.10). 
 44. Id.
 45. See id. ¶ 6. 
 46. Summary Records—4th Meeting, supra note 25, ¶ 40, reprinted in Official 
Records, supra note 12, at 251. 
 47. Id. ¶ 35. 
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voted in favor of the amendment proposed by the Canada 
delegation.48
The Belgian delegation had also proposed a new 
paragraph in Article 6 providing that an express choiceof
law clause should have the effect of excluding the CISG: 
The application of this Convention shall be excluded if the 
parties have stated that their contract is subject to a specific 
national law.49 The Belgian proposal was considered at the 
same time as the Canada proposal and also was not 
adopted.50 In fact, some of the vocal opposition to the 
proposed amendment was quite strong. Mr. Plantard of 
France indicated that, to the extent that the wording of 
Article 6 was unclear, he was prepared to support amending 
Article 6 by means of any proposal diametrically opposed to 
the tenor of the amendment proposed by the Belgian 
delegation.51 After the Canada amendment was roundly 
rejected, the Belgian delegation withdrew its proposed 
amendment.52
Thus, the drafters specifically considered proposals to 
amend Article 6 in a way that would have made inclusion in 
a contract of an express choiceoflaw clause tantamount to 
an automatic exclusion of the CISG under Article 6, and 
they overwhelmingly rejected the notion. The travaux 
préparatoires therefore show that a choiceoflaw clause 
should not have the effect of automatically excluding the 
CISG. Moreover, the understanding that is appropriate 
under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, that 
is, that a choiceoflaw clause choosing the laws of a 
jurisdiction within the United States in fact chooses the 
CISG when the CISG is otherwise applicable by its terms, is 
the best understanding of the effect of a choiceoflaw clause 
under the CISG as well. 
 48. Report of the First Committee, supra note 28, ¶ 6, reprinted in Official 
Records, supra note 12, at 8586. 
 49. Id. ¶ 3(v). 
 50. Id. ¶ 6. 
 51. Summary Records—4th Meeting, supra note 25, ¶ 41, reprinted in Official 
Records, supra note 12, at 251 (emphasis added). 
 52. Report of the First Committee, supra note 28, ¶ 6, reprinted in Official 
Records, supra note 12, at 86. 
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III. THE APPROACH TAKEN BY U.S. COURTS
Few U.S. courts have carefully analyzed or squarely 
addressed the question of exclusion of the CISG.53 More 
than one U.S. court has noted that there has been a relative 
paucity of U.S. case law interpreting and applying the 
CISG, though this is beginning to change.54 In the rare 
instances when U.S. courts have addressed this issue, they 
have largely not engaged in careful analysis of the issue and 
instead have made casual statements in dicta regarding 
application or exclusion of the CISG. Those casual 
statements are often imprecise in a way that leads to 
misunderstanding of the application of the CISG and its 
effective exclusion. 
 53. The lack of case law analyzing the CISG has been argued by at least one 
commentator to be a myth. See Lisa Spagnolo, A Glimpse through the 
Kaleidoscope: Choices of Law and the CISG, 13 VINDOBONA J. INTL COM. L. &
ARB. 135, 153 & n.81 (2009) (stating that scarcity of CISG case law is a 
misconception and pointing out that there are more than 2000 CISG cases on 
the Pace University CISG website). However, at least some U.S. courtsand 
therefore U.S. practitioners and their clientsare simply unlikely to rely on 
decisions of courts outside the United States. While that is arguably 
problematic, given the purposes of the CISG, it is nevertheless the case that the 
relevant reference point for such U.S. courts is the volume of U.S. case law 
analyzing the CISG. 
 54. Whether empirically accurate or not, the lack of U.S. case law 
interpreting and applying the CISG has routinely been noted by U.S. courts. 
See, e.g., Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Engg & Consulting GmbH, No. 
1:05CV00702, 2009 WL 818618, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009) 
(acknowledging that the case law interpreting and applying the CISG is sparse) 
Forestal Guarani, S.A. v. Daros Intl, Inc., Civil Action No. 034821 (JAG), 2008 
WL 4560701, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 613 F.3d 395, 
396 (3d Cir. 2010) (Although the CISG has been in force for nearly two decades, 
there still are few U.S. decisions interpreting the Convention.). As noted, this is 
beginning to change. In 2009 alone there were thirteen opinions reported by 
U.S. courts that recognized the application or potential application of the CISG 
and/or that analyzed the CISG in some way, though most contained little 
analysis. See William P. Johnson, U.N. Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, in International Commercial Transactions, 
Franchising, and Distribution, 44 INTL LAW. 238, 23940 (2010). In 2010 alone, 
there were sixteen opinions reported by U.S. courts that contain some analysis 
or interpretation of the CISG. 
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A.  American Biophysics Corp. v. Dubois Marine Specialties
The clearest example of incorrect analysis of the effect 
of a choiceoflaw clause on application of the CISG is a 
2006 decision of a federal district court in American 
Biophysics Corp. v. Dubois Marine Specialties.55 American 
Biophysics Corp. was a U.S. company with its principal 
place of business in Rhode Island, and Dubois Marine 
Specialties was a Canadian company with its principal 
place of business in Manitoba, Canada.56 The parties 
entered into a written NonExclusive Distributorship 
Agreement under which Dubois agreed to purchase and 
resell products manufactured by American Biophysics.57
Among other terms, the written agreement included a 
choiceoflaw clause providing for the agreement to be 
construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of 
Rhode Island.58 And it provided that the courts of Rhode 
Island were to have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters 
arising from the agreement.59
American Biophysics subsequently brought an action 
against Dubois for breach of their agreement or, in the 
alternative, for recovery on book account or for goods sold 
and delivered.60 Dubois made a motion to dismiss based on 
forum non conveniens and lack of personal jurisdiction.61 In 
support of its argument that the court lacked jurisdiction, 
Dubois argued that the forum selection clause should not be 
enforced.62
Dubois asserted that its agreement with American 
Biophysics was governed by the CISG in apparent support 
of its argument that the forum selection clause should not 
 55. 411 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D.R.I. 2006). 
 56. Id. at 62. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 6162. 
 61. Id. at 62. 
 62. See id. at 6263. 
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be enforced.63 However, the court concluded that the CISG 
was not applicable to the dispute.64 The court reached that 
conclusion not because the agreement was something other 
than a contract of sale of goods, which might have been a 
supportable conclusion due to the distributorship nature of 
the agreement. Instead, the court reached its conclusion 
because the contract contained a choiceoflaw clause.65 And 
the court reached that conclusion despite specifically 
considering arguments made by Dubois that the CISG had 
not been excluded by the mere inclusion of a choiceoflaw 
clause, reasoning as follows: 
[I]t appears that the CISG is inapplicable. The CISG governs 
contracts for the sale of goods where the parties have places of 
business in different nations, the nations are CISG signatories, 
and the contract does not contain a choice of law provision. Amco 
Ukrservice v. Am. Meter Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686 (E.D. Pa. 
2004) (emphasis added) see 15 U.S.C. App. at Art. 1(1)(a). More 
specifically, Chapter I, Article 6 of the CISG provides that: The 
parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject 
to Article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its 
provisions.
Here, as already noted, subsection 11(h) of the Agreement 
provides that the Agreement shall be construed and enforced in 
accordance with the laws of the state of Rhode Island. That 
provision is sufficient to exclude application of the CISG.
66
The court was simply incorrect when it concluded that 
the choiceoflaw clause choosing the laws of Rhode Island 
was sufficient to exclude application of the CISG and the 
authority cited by the court does not support the courts 
conclusion that the CISG did not apply to the contract. In 
reaching its conclusion, the court cited five federal court 
 63. Id. at 63. It is unclear how application of the CISG would have precluded 
American Biophysics action from being heard in the Rhode Island court, a point 
Dubois apparently failed to address. Id.
 64. Id. 
 65. See id.
 66. Id. at 63 (citing Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 
n.1 (2d Cir. 1995) Viva Vino Imp. Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.r.l., No. CIV.A. 99
6384, 2000 WL 1224903, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2000) Fercus, S.R.L. v. 
Palazzo, No 98 CIV. 7728 (NRB), 2000 WL 1118925, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 
2000) Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 8052(HB)(THK), 1998 WL 
164824, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. April 7, 1998)). 
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opinions, none of which held that mere inclusion of a choice
oflaw clause would automatically operate to exclude 
application of the CISG. Rather, each of the cases cited by 
the court in American Biophysics offers an example of 
imprecision in language that has led to misapplication of 
the law. 
B.  Authority Cited in American Biophysics: A Pattern of 
Imprecision 
1. Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp. A Second Circuit 
decision, Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp.,67 is the 
earliest decision cited by the court in American Biophysics, 
and is one of the earliest decisions by a U.S. court analyzing 
the CISG. It is a case that has been misunderstood and 
improperly interpreted to stand for the proposition that an 
express choiceoflaw clause has the effect of excluding the 
application of the CISG.68 But a careful review of the case 
shows that it does not stand for that proposition. 
The Delchi Carrier case arose out of a dispute between 
an Italian buyer and a New York seller of compressors.69 In 
the court below, there was a bench trial that resulted in 
judgment in favor of the Italian buyer, Delchi Carrier SpA, 
in the amount of nearly two million dollars.70 The seller, 
Rotorex Corporation, appealed, and Delchi crossappealed 
the denial of certain damages.71
The district court held, and the parties agreed, that the 
matter was governed by the CISG.72 Therefore, application 
of the CISGand the effect on the analysis of the absence 
or inclusion of a choiceoflaw clausewas not before the 
court. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit provided in dicta 
(and, notably, in general terms only) a description of when 
the CISG applies.73
 67. 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 68. See, e.g., SchmitzWerke GmbH & Co. v. Rockland Indus., Inc., 37 F. 
Appx 687, 691 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 69. 71 F.3d at 1026. 
 70. See id. at 1026. 
 71. Id. at 1027. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. at n.1. 
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The court began with the following: Generally, the 
CISG governs sales contracts between parties from different 
signatory countries.74 Of course, even this general 
statement by the Second Circuit provides an example of the 
risks of relying on dicta for accurate and precise statements 
of law. Indeed, contrary to the courts broad assertion, the 
CISG applies only to sale of goods contracts and not to all 
sales contracts.75 Moreover, even some sale of goods 
contracts are specifically excluded from the sphere of 
application of the CISG.76 But taken at face value and out of 
context, the first sentence of the courts dicta could be 
interpreted to suggest that the CISG applies to all sales 
contractsthough such an interpretation would be an 
incorrect understanding of the sphere of application of the 
CISG, of course. And the court qualified its characterization 
of the sphere of application of the CISG with the 
introductory clause [g]enerally, which makes it clear that 
the court is not purporting to definitively identify the 
sphere of application of the CISG. 
The court went on to state (correctly) that the CISG 
makes it clear that the parties may by contract choose to be 
bound by a source of law other than the CISG, such as the 
Uniform Commercial Code.77 The court further noted that 
the agreement in this matter was silent as to choice of law 
and that when that is the case, the CISG applies if both 
parties are located in signatory nations: If, as here, the 
agreement is silent as to choice of law, the Convention 
applies if both parties are located in signatory nations.78
Unfortunately, while this characterization of the sphere 
of application of the CISG may be true as a general matter, 
the language is not precise, and the statement will not be 
accurate in every instance. The language is not precise to 
the extent that it suggeststhough without explicitly 
assertingthat if an agreement is not silent as to choice of 
law, then the CISG would automatically be excluded and 
would therefore not apply. While that is not what the court 
 74. Id.
 75. This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods . . . . CISG, supra
note 3, art. 1(1) (emphasis added). 
 76. See id. arts. 23.  
 77. 71 F.3d at 1027 n.1 (citing CISG, supra note 3, art. 6). 
 78. Id. (citing CISG, supra note 3, art. 1). 
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stated in its dicta, it is precisely that converse inference 
that has caused the language to be used to improperly 
describe the effect of an express choiceoflaw clause. 
Furthermore, the language used by the Second Circuit 
in its dicta is not necessarily even going to be accurate in 
every instance. As is demonstrated in Part VI, infra, even 
when the agreement is silent as to choice of lawand is 
silent as to the application or exclusion of the CISGthe 
court might need to determine whether the parties intended 
nevertheless to exclude application of the CISG. While the 
parties failure to do so explicitly could be evidence of their 
intent not to exclude application of the CISG, such failure 
should not be dispositive of the issue. That is, the CISG does 
not provide for exclusion to occur by any specific means, and 
it could be the case that the parties to the contract have 
excluded application of the CISG without having done so by 
express, written means. 
In any event, inclusion of a choiceoflaw clause, without 
more, does not show the parties intent to exclude 
application of the CISG. In Delchi Carrier, the parties 
agreed that the CISG governed, and application of the CISG 
therefore did not require complicated analysis. But when 
application of the CISG is disputed, the analysis that is 
necessary or appropriate to resolve the dispute could be 
much more complex than the courts statements in dicta 
have been interpreted to suggest. 
Perhaps recognizing that it was on shaky ground in its 
reliance on the Delchi Carrier decision, the court in 
American Biophysics cited additional authority to reach its 
conclusion regarding the effect of a choiceoflaw clause on 
its analysis of the exclusion of the CISG.79 But as the court 
had done with respect to Delchi Carrier, the court relied on 
imprecise statements included in dicta in the four other 
decisions as well. 
2. Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd. The earliest district 
court decision on which the court in American Biophysics
relied is Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd.80 In that case, 
Calzaturificio Claudia s.n.c., an Italian seller of shoes, 
brought a claim against Olivieri Footwear Ltd., a U.S. 
 79. See 411 F. Supp. 2d 61, 63 (D.R.I. 2006). 
 80. No. 96 Civ. 8052(HB)(THK), 1998 WL 164824 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998). 
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buyer, for nonpayment in breach of contract.81 The parties 
had no formal written contract in place, but Claudia 
claimed that the parties had entered into thirteen 
transactions, and Claudia had prepared and submitted 
invoices in connection with the claimed transactions.82
Olivieri counterclaimed for breach of contract, claiming 
that Claudia failed to deliver certain goods, and that the 
goods that were delivered were either late or 
nonconforming.83 Claudia moved for summary judgment on 
its breach of contract claim, and Olivieri opposed the 
motion.84
The court noted that to prevail on its motion, Claudia 
had to be able to show that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the terms of the parties agreement, 
or concerning the parties agreement to be bound by the 
terms of the invoices and Claudias fulfillment of its 
obligations under the parties agreement.85 To analyze 
whether Claudia had demonstrated the foregoing, the court 
applied the CISG.86
The court concluded that the CISG governed the 
transactions between Claudia and Olivieri because the 
CISG governs contracts for the sale of goods when the 
parties have their respective places of business in different 
countries that are signatories to the CISG absent a choice
oflaw provision to the contrary.87 The court further stated 
in dicta, [a]s the contractual relationship between . . . 
 81. Id. at *1. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at *12. Olivieri opposed the motion on the basis that there existed 
disputed issues of material fact, by arguing that there was no agreement 
between the parties that even if there was an agreement between the parties, 
there was no agreement on the disputed delivery term that, in any event, 
Olivieri did not receive the goods in question and that Claudia had delayed 
performance and delivered nonconforming goods. Id. at *2. 
 85. Id. at *4. 
 86. See id. at *47. 
 87. Id. at *4 (citing CISG, supra note 3, art. 1(1)(a) (When two foreign 
nations are signatories to this Convention, as are the United States and Italy, 
the Convention governs contracts for the sale of goods between parties whose 
places of business are in these different nations, absent a choiceoflaw provision 
to the contrary.)).
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[Claudia and Olivieri] did not provide for a choice of law, the 
CISG controls.88
Like the dicta in Delchi Carrier, the language the 
Claudia court used to describe the effect of a choiceoflaw 
clause is imprecise and has the potential to cause 
misunderstanding, which is precisely what appears to have 
happened with the court in American Biophysics. That is, 
there is a risk that where the court states that because the 
contract did not provide for a choice of law, the CISG 
controls, the court was also reasoning that if the parties 
had provided for choice of law by including a choiceoflaw 
clause in their contract, then the CISG would not control, 
even though the court did not explicitly so hold, and even 
though that issue was not before the court. 
For purposes of determining whether there was any 
issue of material fact with respect to the existence and 
terms of the contract between Claudia and Olivieri, 
however, the court in Claudia considered the effect of the 
lack of a writing requirement under the CISG.89 And the 
method of analysis that the court used under the CISG 
could be used to determine whether the parties to a sale of 
goods contract intended to exclude application of the CISG. 
For example, the court noted that contracts governed by the 
CISG are freed from the limits of the parol evidence rule 
otherwise applicable under Article 2 of the UCC, allowing 
for a wider spectrum of admissible evidence to be considered 
in construing the terms of the parties agreement.90 In fact, 
the court reasoned, the CISGs lack of a writing 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. at *56. 
 90. Id. at *5 (citations omitted). The UCCs parol evidence rule provides as 
follows: 
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the 
parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by 
the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such 
terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of 
any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may 
be explained or supplemented (a) by course of performance, course of 
dealing, or usage of trade (Section 1303), and (b) by evidence of 
consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have 
been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms 
of the agreement. 
U.C.C. § 2202 (2002). 
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requirement would allow evidence even when the evidence 
contradicts the writing.91
Thus, the court in Claudia seemed to recognize that in 
order to apply the CISG faithfully and to resolve a disputed 
issue as to the terms of a contract governed by the CISG, 
which should include any dispute regarding whether the 
parties have excluded application of the CISG, the analysis 
is more complex than simply pointing to the existence of a 
choiceoflaw clause. Unfortunately, the court in American 
Biophysics did not take note of that aspect of the Claudia
decision. 
3. Fercus, S.R.L. v. Palazzo. The court in American 
Biophysics also cited Fercus, S.R.L. v. Palazzo, an 
unpublished opinion of a federal district court.92 Fercus
arose out of a transaction involving the supply of shoes 
manufactured by an Italian shoe manufacturer, Fercus, 
S.R.L., and sent by Fercus to USA National Shoe Corp.93
USA National Shoe was an affiliate of MP Shoes Corp., 
Fercuss exclusive sales representative for the United States 
and Canada.94 The shoes were ultimately delivered to and 
accepted by Shonac Corp., a thirdparty buyer.95 Fercus 
brought claims against each of the foregoing, as well as 
against Mario Palazzo, the owner of USA National Shoes 
and MP Shoes, and against DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc., an 
affiliate of Shonac.96
Shonac and DSW moved for summary judgment on the 
claims brought against them.97 Shonac argued that there 
 91. Claudia, 1998 WL 164824, at *5. Under the UCCs parol evidence rule, by 
contrast, whenever there is a written agreement that is intended to be final, the 
written agreement will exclude evidence of any previously agreedupon terms 
(even those that are in writing) and of any terms agreed upon orally at the time 
of entry into the contract, if those extrinsic terms contradict the writing. This is 
the case even if the written agreement is found to be incomplete. See U.C.C. § 2
202. 
 92. No. 98 CIV. 7728(NRB), 2000 WL 1118925 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2000). 
 93. Id. at *1. 
 94. See id.
 95. Id.
 96. See id.
 97. Id.
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was never a contract between it and Fercus upon which 
Fercus could bring a breach of contract claim.98
In its consideration of Shonacs argument, the court 
launched into a strained statuteoffrauds analysis under 
Article 2 of the UCC.99 Fercus argued that the CISG would 
govern its contract with Shonac, and the CISG contains no 
statute of frauds, so the statute of frauds should not have 
been relevant for formation of any contract between it and 
Shonac.100 In response, the court concluded that it 
ultimately did not matter whether there was a contract 
between Fercus and Shonac if there was no contract, then 
there could be no claim for breach, and if there was a 
contract, then the facts as alleged showed that Shonac was 
not in breach.101 Therefore, whether the CISG applied was 
immaterial to the disposition of the motion before the court. 
Nevertheless, the court stated that [t]he C.I.S.G. applies to 
any sale of goods when: (1) the contracting parties have 
places of business in different nations (2) the nations are 
signatories to the [CISG] and (3) the contract between the 
parties does not have a choice of law provision.102
Ultimately, the court granted Shonac and DSWs motion 
for summary judgment.103 Strangely, the court in Fercus
never addressed the question of contract formation under 
the CISG, even though it should have. Because Fercuss 
place of business was in Italy and Shonacs place of business 
 98. Id. at *2. 
 99. See id. at *23. 
 100. See id. at *3. Article 96 of the CISG permits a country that is a party to 
the CISG to declare essentially that a domestic statute of frauds prevails over 
Article 11. CISG, supra note 3, art. 96. Italy has not made such a declaration. 
See CISG Status, supra note 14. 
 101. See Fercus, 2000 WL 1118925 at *34. 
 102. Id. at *3 (citing Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 
n.1 (2d Cir. 1995) CISG, supra note 3, art. 1(1)(a)).  
 103. The court granted Shonac and DSWs motion for summary judgment 
because Shonac paid for the shoes in accordance with payment instructions 
provided by Palazzo. See id. at *16. Fercus submitted an invoice to Shonac 
which was never paid. See id. at *1. Instead, Shonac paid for the shoes in 
accordance with payment instructions Shonac subsequently received from 
Palazzo. Id. If there was a contract between Shonac and Fercus at all, then it 
was due to actions of Fercus agent, and Fercus agent provided payment 
instructions that were followed by Shonac. See id. at *3. Therefore, there was no 
claim for breach. Id. 
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was in the United States, both of which areand were at 
the timeparties to the CISG, and because the contract, if 
there was one, was a contract of sale of goods (in this case, 
sales of shoes), and because none of the exceptions 
contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the CISG appear to have 
been applicable, Fercus was correct when Fercus argued 
that if there were a contract between it and Shonac, it 
would have been governed by the CISG. Because the 
contract would have been governed by the CISG, the court 
should have at least considered the possibility of formation 
of a contract under Articles 14 through 19 of the CISG.104
Upon any finding that a contract had formed under the 
CISG, Fercuss claim for breach should have then been 
analyzed under the CISG.  
The courts failure to analyze contract formation under 
the CISG is an example of a U.S. court potentially 
misapplying municipal law at the expense of the proper 
application of the CISG. In any event, the Fercus decision 
offers no independent authority for the conclusion reached 
by the American Biophysics court regarding exclusion of the 
CISG. 
4. Viva Vino Import Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.r.l. The 
court in American Biophysics relied on dicta from Viva Vino 
Import Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.r.l., another unpublished 
opinion of a federal district court.105 The dispute in Viva 
Vino arose out of three alleged agreements between Farnese 
Vini S.r.l., an Italian wine producer and supplier, and Viva 
Vino Import Corporation, a U.S. company and distributor.106
Viva Vino claimed breach of contract, promissory estoppel, 
unjust enrichment, and tortious interference with business 
relations.107 Farnese counterclaimed for breach of contract.108
 104. For example, it is plausible that the order submitted by Shonac for Fercus 
shoes to Fercus exclusive sales representative could have constituted an offer 
under Article 14, Section 1 of the CISG, which could have been accepted by 
Fercus pursuant to Article 18 of the CISG by means of its performance. See
CISG, supra note 3, arts. 14(1), 18(3). In that event, the terms of the invoice 
should have been analyzed under the CISG, and Shonacs payment in 
accordance with the instructions from Palazzo should have been considered 
under the CISG as well.  
 105. No. CIV.A. 996384, 2000 WL 1224903 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2000). 
 106. Id. at *1. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id.
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In this case, governing law was in dispute, and the focus 
of the opinion was to determine the appropriate body (or 
bodies) of law to apply to the claims.109 Viva Vino argued 
that the CISG, Pennsylvania law, or both governed the 
claims.110 Farnese argued that Italian law should apply.111
The court analyzed whether the CISG applied to the claims 
sounding in contract and concluded that it did not apply.112
The court reasoned that the contracts at issue, as 
distributorship agreements, did not cover sales of specific 
goods or contain definite terms regarding quantity and price 
and therefore were not contracts of sale of goods for 
purposes of the CISG.113 Because the court concluded that 
the contracts at issue were not contracts of sale of goods for 
purposes of the CISG, there was no need to engage in any 
analysis regarding the effect of a choiceoflaw clause on the 
applicability of the CISG. However, in reaching its 
conclusion, the court nevertheless casually noted in dicta 
that the CISG governs contracts for the sale of goods 
between parties whose places of business are in different 
nations that are signatories to the CISG unless the 
contract contains a choice of law provision to the 
contrary.114
This is another example of a court making an imprecise 
statement in dicta regarding the role of a choiceoflaw 
clause when that issue was not before the court. In fact, the 
potential harm created by this imprecise statement is 
arguably greater than the potential harm created by the 
imprecise statements in Delchi Carrier, Claudia, and 
Fercus. That is, the clear implication of stating that the 
CISG governs a contract unless the contract contains a 
choice of law provision to the contrary is that if the 
contract contains a choiceoflaw clause to the contrary, 
then the CISG necessarily does not govern that contract, 
which suggests a consequence of inclusion of a choiceoflaw 
 109. See id. at *13. 
 110. Id. at *1. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. at *12. 
 113. Id. at *2. 
 114. Id. at *1 (citing Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Intl Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 
1229, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)). 
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clause that is not supported by the text of the CISG and was 
never intended by its drafters. 
Of course, the language of the court in Viva Vino begs 
the question: What would constitute a choiceoflaw clause 
“to the contrary”? But the court offered no guidance 
regarding what, in the court’s view, would be enough for the 
choiceoflaw clause to exclude application of the CISG or 
how the phrase “to the contrary” should be interpreted. A 
court could interpret the phrase choiceoflaw clause “to the 
contrary” to mean only a choiceoflaw clause that 
effectively excludes application of the CISG. Unfortunately, 
that is not what the court in Viva Vino actually stated, and 
that is not how the court in American Biophysics
interpreted the phrase. 
Ultimately, the court in Viva Vino applied Pennsylvania 
state law—and not the CISG—to all claims, on the grounds 
that none of the underlying agreements at issue in the 
dispute was a contract of sale of goods. For that reason, the 
CISG would not apply, whether it was excluded or not.115
Therefore, exclusion of the CISG is never at issue in the 
Viva Vino decision, which presumably helps to explain why 
the analysis of application of the CISG is not carefully 
articulated. 
5. Amco Ukrservice v. American Meter Company. 
Finally, the court in American Biophysics cited Amco 
Ukrservice v. American Meter Co.116 The dispute in Amco 
Ukrservice arose out of two joint venture agreements.117 The 
two joint venture entities began submitting orders for 
products which were to be supplied by American Meter 
pursuant to the joint venture agreements.118 But American 
Meter subsequently stopped a shipment of goods that was 
 115. Id. at *1, *3. 
 116. 312 F. Supp. 2d 681 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
 117. Id. at 683. The first joint venture agreement created a joint venture 
entity called Prompriladamco and was entered into by and among four parties, 
including American Meter Company and a Ukrainian manufacturing company, 
Promprilad, for developing the market for American Meter’s gas meter products. 
Id. at 684. The second joint venture was entered into by American Meter and 
AmericanUkrainian Business Consultants, L.P., one of the other shareholders 
of the first joint venture, for developing the Ukrainian market for the gas piping 
products of a whollyowned subsidiary of American Meter. Id. at 685. 
 118. Id. 
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on its way to Ukraine and refused to extend credit to either 
joint venture entity, effectively terminating the joint 
ventures.119 The joint venture entities filed parallel 
complaints, which were consolidated by the court, claiming 
that American Meter had breached the joint venture 
agreements by refusing to deliver the goods that the joint 
venture entities could sell in the applicable market.120
American Meter moved for summary judgment on the 
basis that the joint venture agreements were invalid under 
both the CISG and Ukrainian law.121 After a careful and 
detailed analysis, the court concluded that the joint venture 
agreements were not governed by the CISG, reasoning that, 
although the CISG might have governed discrete contracts 
for the sale of goods entered into under either of the joint 
venture agreements, the CISG did not apply to the joint 
venture agreements themselves because they were not 
contracts of sale of goods.122 Notwithstanding that ultimate 
conclusion, the court included in dicta the statement that 
the CISG “applies to contracts for the sale of goods where 
the parties have places of business in different nations, the 
nations are CISG signatories, and the contract does not 
contain a choice of law provision.”123
Thus, a careful review of each of the five decisions relied 
upon by American Biophysics shows that, in each case, the 
language cited by the court in American Biophysics is not 
part of the holding of the cited decision, and should not have 
been relied upon to support the court’s conclusion. Rather, 
the authority relied upon by the court in American 
Biophysics offers several examples of imprecise descriptions, 
in dicta, of the application of the CISG when the question of 
exclusion of the CISG by the parties was either not in 
dispute or had otherwise been rendered moot and, in any 
event, was not carefully analyzed by any court. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 68586. 
 122. Id. at 68687. 
 123. Id. at 686 (citing Fercus, S.R.L. v. Palazzo, 2000 WL 1118925, at *3) 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2000) (emphasis added). 
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C. The Wake of American Biophysics: The Imprecision 
Continues 
In fact, the five decisions cited by the court in American 
Biophysics are not the only U.S. court decisions engaging in 
imprecision in a way that leads to misapplication in this 
area. On the contrary, imprecision with respect to the effect 
of a choiceoflaw clause continues. Recently, in Golden 
Valley Grape Juice & Wine, LLC v. Centrisys Corp., the 
court used imprecise language to refer to the effect of a 
choiceoflaw clause and arguably misapplied California 
domestic law.124
The case arose out of a sale of a centrifuge by Centrisys 
Corporation, a Wisconsin corporation, to Golden Valley 
Grape Juice and Wine, LLC, a California limited liability 
company.125 The centrifuge was manufactured by Separator 
Technology Solutions PTY Ltd. (“STS”), an Australian 
company.126 Centrisys was operating as STS’s distributor.127
The centrifuge sold by Centrisys to Golden Valley did not 
perform in accordance with its specifications.128 Golden 
Valley notified Centrisys, and Golden Valley claimed that it 
had been assured by both Centrisys and STS that the defect 
would be cured.129
Later, Golden Valley sued Centrisys under their 
contract for sale of the centrifuge, and Centrisys filed a 
third party complaint against STS.130 STS moved to dismiss 
the claim against it for change of venue pursuant to a forum 
selection clause that STS argued was part of its agreement 
with Centrisys.131 The clause required disputes to be 
 124. No. CV F 091424 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 347897, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 
2010). 
 125. Id. at *1. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. 
 131. Id. 
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resolved by litigation in Victoria, Australia or through 
arbitration, at STS’s option.132
Centrisys argued that the forum selection clause was 
not part of the agreement because Centrisys never agreed to 
be bound by the STS document entitled “General 
Conditions” which contained the clause.133 In order to 
analyze whether the “General Conditions” were part of the 
agreement between the parties, the court analyzed 
questions of contract formation under the CISG.134
To begin its analysis, the court made several statements 
about the CISG and its application. Among others, the court 
haphazardly stated that “[t]he CISG governs contracts for 
the sale of goods between parties whose places of business 
are in different nations, if the nations are Contracting 
States, unless the subject contract contains a choiceoflaw 
provision.”135 Like the dicta in Viva Vino, this imprecise and 
inaccurate statement is even more misleading than the 
imprecise statements in most of the cases cited by American 
Biophysics. By stating that the CISG governs a contract 
“unless the subject contract contains a choiceoflaw 
provision,”136 the court seems to be stating that if the subject 
contract does contain a choiceoflaw clause, then the CISG 
necessarily does not govern the contract. And unlike the 
language used in Viva Vino, this court appears to suggest 
that any choiceoflaw clause would have that effect, not 
only a “choice of law provision to the contrary.”137
After making its incorrect and misleading statement, 
the court then strangely stated that STS and Centrisys 
“acknowledge that the United States and Australia are 
signatories to the CISG” and that they “agree that their 
contract is governed by the CISG.”138 Remarkably, the court 
 132. Id. The contract included the following clause: “Any dispute between the 
parties shall be finally settled in accordance with laws of Victoria (the 
jurisdiction shall be the State of Victoria) or through arbitration at STS P/L’s 
option.” Id. 
 133. Id.
 134. See id. at *45. 
 135. Id. at *2 (citing CISG, supra note 3, arts. 1, 6). 
 136. Id. at *2. 
 137. Viva Vino Import Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.R.L. , No. CIV.A. 996384, 2000 
WL 1224903, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2000). 
 138. Golden Valley Grape Juice & Wine, LLC, 2010 WL 347897 at *3. 
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then reasoned that, “the CISG governs the substantive 
question of contract formation, including whether the forum 
selection clause was part of the parties’ agreement.”139 And 
the court analyzed the contract between Centrisys and STS 
under the CISG, even though the contract contained a 
choiceoflaw provision.140 The court therefore applied the 
correct body of law, notwithstanding its incorrect statement 
that the CISG applies unless the contract contains a choice
oflaw clause. And despite its imprecision, the court’s 
analysis under the CISG of contract formation is largely 
sound.141
Similarly, a federal district court in Forestal Guarani, 
S.A. v. Daros International, Inc., despite exercising 
apparent care and ordering the parties to submit 
 139. Id.
 140. See id. at *25. 
 141. However, later in the opinion the court provides another example of 
imprecision that can lead to misapplication when analyzing Centrisys’ 
argument that, if the General Conditions were part of the agreement, a 
paragraph of the General Conditions dealing with allocation of risk of product 
liability claims ought to control the choice of forum. Id. at *67. In rejecting 
Centrisys’ argument, the court applied California law, noting that the court was 
applying California law for purposes of the product liability issue, even though 
the court stated that “the General Conditions contain a choiceoflaw provision 
in which Australian law is chosen” but that “Australian law has not been 
provided” to the court. Id. at *7 n.3. Because the CISG was found by the court to 
apply to this dispute and to the contract, the court should have first looked to 
the CISG. The court might have ultimately concluded that the CISG was not the 
appropriate body of law to analyze Centrisys’ argument, due to Article 5 of the 
CISG, which provides: “This Convention does not apply to the liability of the 
seller for death or personal injury caused by the goods to any person.” CISG, 
supra note 3, art. 5. But the court should have done so explicitly. Then, it should 
have conducted an appropriate choiceoflaw analysis to determine whether to 
apply to the claim California law, the laws of Victoria, or some other body of 
law. 
Arguably, however, Centrisys’ argument was, at its heart, a question of contract 
interpretation and concerned the rights and obligations of the parties under 
their agreement (and, more specifically, under Paragraph 10 of the General 
Conditions). And in that respect, proper interpretation of the applicable contract 
terms would very much be governed by the CISG. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 4. 
In any event, the court’s terse statement that, “[f]or purposes of the ‘product 
liability’ issue only, the Court applies California law” because Australian law 
has not been provided to the court, appears to be an unprincipled and erroneous 
automatic application of the local law of the jurisdiction of the forum. Golden 
Valley, 2010 WL 347897 at *7 n.3. 
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supplemental briefs addressing five questions of law 
regarding the CISG,142 nevertheless described the 
application of the CISG and its exclusion imprecisely. The 
court stated that the CISG governs contracts for the sale of 
goods between parties whose places of business are in 
different nations that have ratified the CISG, but that such 
parties “may, nevertheless include an alternative choice of 
law provision.”143 And the court continued that if the 
agreement is silent as to choice of law, then the CISG 
applies.144
It will usually be the case that silence will lead to 
application of the CISG (when the CISG is otherwise 
applicable by its terms), though not necessarily. But it is not 
the case that the inclusion of an alternative choiceoflaw 
clause will automatically exclude the CISG, as could 
arguably be suggested by the court’s statement in dicta. 
Finally, one federal court has gone so far as to cite 
favorably to the American Biophysics decision.145 In 
considering a dispute between plaintiff Easom Automation 
Systems, Inc., a U.S. company, and defendant 
Thyssenkrupp Fabco, Corp., a Canadian company, which 
arose out of Easom’s agreement to design, fabricate and 
install a special machine for Thyssenkrupp, the court had to 
determine whether Easom could avail itself of a Michigan 
lien statute.146 Thyssenkrupp argued that the Michigan lien 
statute was inapplicable because the contract was governed 
by Ontario law pursuant to a choiceoflaw/choiceofforum 
clause included in its purchase order, which, according to 
Thyssenkrupp, Easom had accepted.147 Easom responded 
that the CISG, and not the domestic law of Ontario, was the 
applicable law, and that under the CISG, Easom’s terms 
(and not Thyssenkrupp’s) governed because Thyssenkrupp 
had orally accepted Easom’s terms.148
 142. Civ Action No. 034821 (JAG), 2008 WL 4560701, at *12 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 
2008). 
 143. Id. at *3 (citing CISG, supra note 3, art. 6). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Easom Automation Sys., Inc. v. Thyssenkrupp Fabco, Corp., (Easom 
I), No. 0614553, 2007 WL 2875256, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2007). 
 146. Id. at *12. 
 147. Id. at *2. 
 148. Id. 
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The court analyzed the parties’ respective arguments 
and began its analysis with consideration of the CISG and 
its applicability: “The CISG governs contracts for the sale of 
goods between parties whose places of business are in 
different nations, if the nations are Contracting States, 
unless the subject contract contains a choiceoflaw 
provision.”149 Like the court in Golden Valley, the statement 
by this court is not only imprecise, it is inaccurate in that it 
clearly suggests that if the contract does contain a choiceof
law provision, the CISG automatically does not govern the 
contract. Nevertheless, the court strangely goes on to state 
that in order to opt out of the CISG, parties must do so 
expressly.150 And the court concludes that because neither of 
the parties’ respective order documents expressly indicated 
that the CISG did not apply, the CISG governed the 
transaction.151
Thus, the imprecision continues.152 And, in some 
respects, it worsens. The imprecision of language in some 
decisions is especially vexing, given that the courts 
ultimately reach conclusions that are inconsistent with 
their statements. One obvious risk of this imprecise 
characterization of the role of a choiceoflaw clause is that a 
court could ultimately apply the incorrect body of law to the 
dispute. In the United States, that generally means that the 
court will apply Article 2 of the UCC instead of applying the 
CISG. And while the CISG resembles in many ways Article 
2 of the UCC, the CISG varies from Article 2 of the UCC in 
some very important ways. Differences between the CISG 
and UCC Article 2 lead to different results, sometimes of 
critical importance, which has been recognized by some 
courts and commentators.153
 149. Id. at *3 (citing Am. Biophysics Corp. v. Dubois Marine Specialties, 411 F. 
Supp. 2d 61, 6364 (D.R.I. 2006) CISG, supra note 3, arts. 1, 6). 
 150. Id. (citing CISG, supra note 3, art. 6). Express exclusion is not required 
for effective exclusion. See infra Part V. 
 151. Easom I, 2007 WL 2875256, at *3. 
 152. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Power Source Supply, Inc., Civ Action No. 0658 
J, 2008 WL 2884102, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 2008) (The Parties documents 
are silent as to choice of law. This action is therefore governed by the [CISG]).
 153. See, e.g., Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabaté USA Inc., 328 F.3d 
528, 531 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the outcome under the CISG is 
different from the outcome that would likely have been appropriate under 
Article 2 of the UCC) Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Engg & Consulting 
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IV. U.S. COURTS ENGAGING IN CAREFUL ANALYSIS
A. Understanding the Effect of a ChoiceofLaw Clause 
While there are many examples of U.S. courts that have 
been imprecise in their analysis of the CISG and its 
application or effective exclusion, some courts have been 
careful in their analysis of the effect of a choiceoflaw 
clause on the CISG and its application. And several of these 
decisions were reported prior to the American Biophysics
decision.154 Yet, in conducting its analysis, the court in 
GmbH, No. 1:05CV00702, 2009 WL 818618, at *45 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009) 
(There are several critical differences between the law governing contract 
formation under the CISG and the more familiar principles of the Uniform 
Commercial Code.) Louis F. Del Duca & Patrick Del Duca, Selected Topics 
Under the Convention on International Sale of Goods (CISG), 106 DICK L. REV. 
205, 207 (2001) see also Barbara Berry, S.A. de C.V. v. Ken M. Spooner Farms, 
Inc., 254 F. Appx 646, 647 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing district courts grant of 
summary judgment when the district court erred in failing to first analyze 
under the CISG the formation of the underlying contract). 
 154. See, e.g., BP Oil Intl, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 
F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the CISG is the law of Ecuador 
and that a choiceoflaw clause selecting the laws of Ecuador merely confirms 
that the CISG governs the transaction), as amended on denial of reh’g Am. 
Mint LLC v. GOSoftware, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1:05CV650, 2006 WL 42090, at *3 
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2006) (concluding that an express choiceoflaw clause 
choosing the laws of the State of Georgia but silent as to the application of the 
CISG would not have the effect of excluding the CISG) Valero Mktg. & Supply 
Co. v. Greeni Oy, 373 F. Supp. 2d 475, 482 (D.N.J. 2005) (concluding that 
inclusion in an oral agreement of a provision that New York law applied to the 
agreement did not exclude application of the CISG and that, under New York 
law, courts would apply the CISG by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution), rev’d on other grounds, 242 F. Appx 840, 845 (3d Cir. 2007) Ajax 
Tool Works, Inc. v. CanEng Mfg. Ltd., No. 01 C 5938, 2003 WL 223187, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2003) (concluding that a choiceoflaw clause choosing the 
laws of Ontario, Canada does not exclude the CISG) St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. 
v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, GmbH, No. 00 CIV. 9344(SHS), 2002 WL 
465312, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (recognizing that the CISG is an integral 
part of German law, and that when parties designate a choiceoflaw clause in 
their contract selecting the law of a country that is a party to the CISG without 
excluding the CISG, the CISG is the law of the designated country) Asante 
Technologies, Inc. v. PMCSierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 
2001) (concluding that a choiceof law clause choosing the law of British 
Columbia, Canada, chooses the CISG when it is applicable because the CISG is 
the law of British Columbia, and further concluding that a choiceoflaw clause 
choosing the laws of California also would not exclude the CISG). 
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American Biophysics seems to have ignored the more 
careful analysis of the effect of a choiceoflaw clause on the 
exclusion of the CISG that had been conducted by other 
federal courts. One such decision was the decision of the 
Fifth Circuit in BP Oil International, Ltd. v. Empresa 
Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador.155
In BP Oil, the dispute arose out of an agreement by 
which BP Oil International, Ltd. agreed to supply Empresa 
Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador (PetroEcuador), with 
140,000 barrels of unleaded gasoline.156 The agreement 
stated that the gasoline was required to have a gum content 
of less than three milligrams per one hundred milliliters, 
which was to be established at the port of departure.157 BP 
Oil shipped the gasoline, but on arrival at the port of 
destination, the gum content exceeded the permitted 
limit.158 PetroEcuador refused to accept delivery of the 
gasoline, and BP Oil sold it at a loss to a third party.159 BP 
Oil then filed a claim in Texas against PetroEcuador.160
Applying Texas choiceoflaw rules, the district court 
concluded that domestic Ecuadorian law was the 
appropriate substantive law to apply to the transaction, 
based on an apparent choiceoflaw clause in the parties 
contract, which provided as follows: Jurisdiction: Laws of 
the Republic of Ecuador.161 The district court held that 
under domestic Ecuadorian law, BP Oil was obligated to 
deliver conforming goods to Ecuador, the agreedupon 
destination.162 The district court granted summary judgment 
for PetroEcuador.163
BP Oil appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed the 
district court, stating that the district court was correct in 
determining that a federal court is normally to apply the 
choiceoflaw rules of the state where it sits, but that the 
 155. 332 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2003), as amended on denial of reh’g. 




 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 33536. 
 162. Id. at 335. 
 163. Id.
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district court ignored its concurrent federal question 
jurisdiction that made a conflictoflaws analysis 
unnecessary in this case.164 Specifically, the federal question 
jurisdiction statute grants subject matter jurisdiction over 
all civil actions that arise under a U.S. treaty, including the 
CISG.165 The Fifth Circuit recognized that the CISG 
generally applies to contracts for the sale of goods between 
parties whose places of business are in different countries 
when the countries are parties to the CISG, and further 
recognized that the United States and Ecuador have both 
ratified the CISG.166 Therefore, the court concluded, [a]s 
incorporated federal law, the CISG governs the dispute so 
long as the parties have not elected to exclude its 
application.167
PetroEcuador argued that the choiceoflaw provision 
demonstrated the parties intent to apply the domestic law 
of Ecuador, but the Fifth Circuit disagreed: A signatorys 
assent to the CISG necessarily incorporates the treaty as 
part of that nations domestic law. . . . Given that the CISG 
is Ecuadorian law, a choice of law provision designating 
Ecuadorian law merely confirms that the treaty governs the 
transaction.168 The court stated that when the CISG 
applies, if the parties seek to apply a signatorys domestic 
law in lieu of the CISG, they must affirmatively optout of 
the CISG.169 Thus, because the CISG is the law of Ecuador, 
the court held that the CISG governed the dispute.170 In so 
holding, the court reasoned that an affirmative optout 
requirement promotes uniformity and the observance of 
good faith in international trade, two principles that guide 
interpretation of the CISG.171
Similarly, in Ajax Tool Works, Inc. v. CanEng 
Manufacturing Ltd., the court analyzed the effect on the 
applicability of the CISG of a choiceoflaw clause choosing 
 164. Id. at 33436. 
 165. Id.at 336. 
 166. Id. (citing CISG, supra note 3, art. 1(1)(a)). 
 167. Id. at 337 (citing CISG, supra note 3, art. 6). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. (citing CISG, supra note 3, art. 1(1)(a)). 
2011] UNDERSTANDING CISG EXCLUSION 251
the law of Ontario.172 The case arose out of the sale by Can
Eng, a Canadian corporation, to Ajax, a U.S. corporation, of 
a fluidized bed furnace.173 In response to a request for 
proposal, CanEng prepared four proposals to sell to Ajax a 
fluidized bed furnace.174 Ajax rejected the first three 
proposals and accepted the fourth, and the terms of the 
fourth proposal formed the parties contract.175 Among other 
terms, the contract provided that it was to be governed by 
the laws of the Province of Ontario, Canada.176
CanEng shipped the furnace to Ajax, and Ajax 
experienced problems with the furnace over the next four 
years, which eventually led to Ajaxs claims.177 Ajax filed a 
complaint alleging breach of warranty and breach of 
contract.178 CanEng moved for summary judgment.179
The court recognized a threshold question that required 
an answer before analysis of the merits of the claimwhat 
body of law governed the contract and the dispute?180 The 
court noted that the United States and Canada have each 
adopted the CISG, that the CISGs purpose is to provide for 
the orderly conduct of international commerce, and that 
the CISG applies to contracts of sale of goods between 
parties whose places of business are in different countries 
when the countries are parties to the CISG.181 The court 
further noted that the parties may exclude application of 
the CISG by expressly providing in the contract that the 
law of a nonCISG jurisdiction applies or that the CISG does 
not control.182 And the court concluded that the CISG would 
 172. No. 01 C 5938, 2003 WL 223187, at *23 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2003). 
 173. Id. at *1. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id.
 177. See id. at *12. 
 178. Id. at *1. 
 179. Id.
 180. Id. at *2. 
 181. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 3, art. 1(1)(a)). 
 182. Id. at *2 (citing CISG, supra note 3, art. 6). 
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apply to the contract between CanEng and Ajax unless the 
parties had opted out of it.183
With respect to the choiceoflaw clause, the court 
concluded that it [o]bviously did not exclude the CISG 
because the CISG is the law of Ontario.184 The court then 
applied the CISG to analyze CanEngs motion for summary 
judgment.185
Ultimately, the court concluded that there were genuine 
issues of material fact regarding whether CanEng breached 
its warranty and whether its limited warranty terms had 
been waived, irrespective of the body of law that was 
applicable, making summary judgment inappropriate.186
Because there were no facts in dispute regarding limitations 
on CanEngs liability for certain damages, the court 
granted CanEngs motion for summary judgment in part.187
The courts analysis therefore appears to be correct with 
respect to the effect of a choiceoflaw clause in a written 
agreement that is silent on the applicability of the CISG. 
That is, the court correctly concluded that a choiceoflaw 
clause that simply chooses the laws of a jurisdiction that is 
a party to the CISG does not by itself exclude the CISG.188
B.  When Choice of Law Can Exclude the CISG: Selection of 
Domestic Law 
One of the earliest decisions by a U.S. court that 
squarely addresses the issue of the effect of a choiceoflaw 
clause on the courts analysis of the applicability of the 
CISG is Asante Technologies, Inc. v. PMCSierra, Inc.189
Unlike BP Oil and Ajax, however, in Asante Technologies, 
there was no agreedupon choiceoflaw clause in a signed 
agreement, because there was no signed agreement.190
 183. Id. at *3. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. at *36. 
 186. Id. at *45. 
 187. Id. at *67. 
 188. See id. at *3. 
 189. 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
 190. See id. at 1145. 
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Instead, there was a battle of the forms.191 Both parties sent 
forms that included choiceoflaw clauses, and the court 
considered the effect of that exchange of formsand the 
forms respective choiceoflaw clauseson the exclusion of 
the CISG.192
The case arose out of a dispute involving the sale of 
electronic components by a Delaware corporation with its 
headquarters and places of business in British Columbia, 
Canada, to a Delaware corporation with its place of 
business in California.193 The buyer, Asante Technologies, 
Inc., argued that its standard terms and conditions of 
purchase governed, which included a choiceoflaw clause 
providing that the validity and performance of the purchase 
order was to be governed by the laws of the state shown as 
part of the buyers address on the orderCalifornia.194 The 
sellers standard terms and conditions of sale provided for 
the laws of the Province of British Columbia to govern.195
The seller, PMCSierra, Inc., took the position that the 
agreement between the parties was governed by the 
CISG.196 Asante argued that because both parties included a 
choiceoflaw clause in their respective standard forms, the 
parties showed their mutual intent to opt out of the CISG.197
The court concluded that the choiceoflaw clauses included 
in the respective standard forms were inadequate to opt out 
of the CISG.198
The court reasoned that selection of a particular choice 
of law, such as the California Commercial Code or the 
Uniform Commercial Code, could amount to implied 
exclusion of the CISG.199 But here the choiceoflaw clauses 
 191. See id. at 114546. 
 192. See id. at 114950. 
 193. Id. at 114445. 
 194. Id. at 1145. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1147. 
 197. Id. at 1149. 
 198. Id. at 1150. 
 199. Id.
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at issue did not evince a clear intent to opt out of the 
CISG.200
In other words, even a choiceoflaw clause expressly 
choosing the UCC (but presumably silent as to the role of 
the CISG) would not automatically have the effect of 
excluding the CISG. Such a choiceoflaw clause might 
provide evidence of the parties mutual intent to exclude 
application of the CISG under Article 6, and it appears that 
the court in Asante Technologies would consider such 
evidence in its analysis. But inclusion of such a choice of law 
would not be dispositive, the courts reasoning suggests.
C.  Selection of Domestic Law and the Travaux 
Préparatoires 
This understanding of Article 6 of the CISG is the best 
understanding of Article 6, and it is supported by the 
travaux préparatoires. When rejecting the amendments 
proposed by the Belgian and Canadian delegations,201 some 
of the representatives indicated that the only way a choice
oflaw clause could be understood to have the effect of 
excluding the CISG would be to choose specifically some 
named, domestic body of law. Mr. Boggiano (Argentina) 
said that, when the parties subjected their contract to a 
national law, the application of the Convention should be 
excluded only if they referred explicitly to the law on 
domestic sales.202 Similarly, Mr. Rognlien of Norway said 
that the Belgian proposal could be interpreted to be 
consistent with the CISG if the Belgian proposal were 
interpreted to mean that a choiceoflaw clause would have 
the effect of excluding the CISG if the parties chose the 
municipal law of a contracting state by referring to the title 
of such a law.203 Such a choiceoflaw clause would offer 
 200. Id.
 201. See Report of the First Committee, supra note 28, ¶¶ 3(ii), (v), reprinted in 
Official Records, supra note 12, at 86. 
 202. Summary Records—4th Meeting, supra note 25, ¶ 42, reprinted in Official 
Records, supra note 12, at 24851. 
 203. Id. ¶ 38 see Doolim Corp. v. R Doll, LLC, No. 08 Civ. 1587(BSJ)(HBP), 
2009 WL 1514913 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009). The court in Doolim concluded that 
the CISG applied to a contract, which the court found to be a contract of sale of 
goods within the meaning of the CISG, between a seller with its place of 
business in South Korea and a buyer with its place of business in the United 
2011] UNDERSTANDING CISG EXCLUSION 255
evidence of the parties intent for the selected, specifically 
named, municipal law to prevail over the CISG. And the 
court in Asante Technologies astutely recognized that 
possibility. 
Ultimately, the court in Asante Technologies concluded 
that the CISG was applicable, notwithstanding the choice
oflaw clauses.204 The court then continued with a detailed 
and scrupulous analysis of preemption, concluding that the 
CISG preempts state contract law to the extent that the 
state causes of action fall within the scope of the CISG.205
D.  Good Analysis by U.S. Courts in the Wake of American 
Biophysics 
Not all decisions by U.S. courts following American 
Biophysics have imprecisely or incorrectly analyzed the 
effect of a choiceoflaw clause on exclusion of the CISG. The 
federal district court in Michigan that issued the Easom
decision, discussed in Part IV.C, supra, issued a subsequent 
decision upon rehearing the motion at issue in the first 
Easom decision.206 Ironically, while the first Easom decision 
offers an example of a court using imprecise language (and 
citing favorably to American Biophysics), the second Easom
decision reflects a marginally more refined approach to the 
analysis of application of the CISG. 
The matter was before the court on Easom Automation 
Systems, Inc.s motion for rehearing or reconsideration of 
the courts original order denying Easoms original motion 
for immediate repossession of the system it sold to 
Thyssenkrupp Fabco Corp.207 Whereas in the first Easom
States when none of the CISG exceptions to applicability applied. Id. at *5. In 
its analysis, the court cited Delchi Carrier, noting by parenthetical that the 
CISG applies if the agreement is silent as to choice of law and both parties are 
located in signatory nations unless parties have by contract choose[n] [sic] to 
be bound by a source of law other than the CISG, such as the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Id. (quoting Delchi Carrier S.p.A. v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 
1024, 1027 n.1 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 204. Asante, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1150. 
 205. Id. at 1152. 
 206. See Easom Automation Sys., Inc. v. Thyssenkrupp Fabco, Corp., (Easom 
II), No. 0614553, 2008 WL 1901236, at *1, 2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 25, 2008). 
 207. Id. at *1. 
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decision the court imprecisely described the role that a 
choiceoflaw clause plays in the analysis of exclusion of the 
CISG,208 in the second Easom decision there is no reference 
to the role a choiceoflaw clause plays (and the court does 
not cite to American Biophysics), even though the court 
engages in essentially the same analysis as it had in the 
first Easom decision.209
Additionally, in Travelers Property Casualty Co. of 
America v. SaintGobain Technical Fabrics Canada Ltd., a 
federal district court specifically rejected the holding in 
American Biophysics.210 The dispute in Travelers Property 
arose out of a series of arrangements that were entered into 
in connection with the construction of the exterior wall of a 
large, multipurpose arena.211 The specific supply 
arrangement at issue was entered into by TEC Specialty 
Products, Inc., a U.S. company and a components supplier 
for the project, and SaintGobain Technical Fabrics Canada 
Ltd., a Canadian company and a supplier to TEC.212
Specifically, SaintGobain supplied TEC with mesh for the 
exterior wall, which TEC ordered with a purchase order 
containing TECs general terms and conditions of 
purchase.213 SaintGobain shipped the mesh and on the 
same day, sent an invoice containing SaintGobains general 
terms and conditions of sale.214 Thus, the parties engaged in 
a classic battle of the forms. 
After construction was completed, portions of the 
arenas wall lamina debonded, which necessitated repairs 
and led to litigation.215 There were multiple claims filed, but 
at issue in this case was a claim filed against SaintGobain 
 208. See Easom I, 2007 WL 2875256 at *3. 
 209. See Easom II, 2008 WL 1901236 at *2. Nevertheless, the court also 
suggested that the CISG can only be excluded expressly, which is also not 
accurate, as discussed in Part VI. 
 210. 474 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 108182 (D. Minn. 2007). 
 211. Id. at 1077. 
 212. Id.
 213. Id.
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 1078. 
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that alleged that the mesh from SaintGobain was defective 
and caused the debonding.216
The case involved a complex procedural history.217
Among other motions, the plaintiffs moved for partial 
summary judgment, asking the court to find as a matter of 
law that certain terms of the TEC general terms and 
conditions of purchase were part of the contract between 
TEC and SaintGobain.218 SaintGobain argued that, under 
Article 2 of the UCC, the relevant terms in TECs purchase 
order were knocked out of the contract between the 
parties by means of the corresponding terms in Saint
Gobains terms and conditions of sale.219 But the plaintiffs 
argued that the CISG, and not the UCC, was the applicable 
body of law governing contract formation issues in the case, 
and the plaintiffs argued that the CISG would lead to the 
conclusion that the TEC terms and conditions were part of 
the contract between the parties.220
SaintGobain argued that a choiceoflaw provision in 
TECs purchase order that specified that Minnesota law 
governed the contract precluded application of the CISG.221
The court concluded that the CISG was applicable.222
TECs place of business was in the United States, while 
SaintGobains was in Canada.223 The court reasoned that, 
because both the United States and Canada were parties to 
the CISG, the CISG would apply to this contract for the sale 
of mesh unless the parties have excluded its application.224
SaintGobain specifically argued that the parties excluded 
its application by specifying that Minnesota law governed 
 216. Id.
 217. See id. at 1076. 
 218. Id. at 107980. 
 219. Id. at 1080. 
 220. Id. at 1081. 
 221. See id. The choiceoflaw clause at issue stated that the validity, 
interpret[ation], and performance of these terms and conditions and all rights 
and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of 
Minnesota. Id. at 1080. 
 222. Id. at 1081. 
 223. Id.
 224. Id.
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the contract.225 But the court rejected that argument, 
concluding that a mere reference to a specific states law 
does not constitute an exclusion of the CISG.226 When there 
is a choiceoflaw clause choosing the laws of a particular 
state to govern a contract that would be governed by the 
CISG, the state under the Supremacy Clause must honor 
treaties of the United States and, accordingly, the CISG was 
the applicable body of law.227
The court concluded that referring to a states law does 
not have the effect of excluding the CISG, unless an express 
statement is included which provides the CISG does not 
apply.228 In reaching that conclusion, which the court 
characterized as the majority position, the court cited 
American Biophysics as an exception to the majority 
position.229
The courts analysis of the effect of a choiceoflaw 
clause is careful, and its conclusion that a choiceoflaw 
clause should not have the effect of automatically excluding 
the CISG is correct. But, like other U.S. courts, the court 
failed to acknowledge the next step under the CISG, as 
discussed in Part VII, infra, which is to consider whether 
the parties nevertheless intended to exclude the CISG. 
In considering the battle of the forms that took place 
between the parties and TECs argument that its purchase 
order formed the contract under the CISGs contract 
formation rules, the court did, however, acknowledge that 
the analysis required looking at more than just the writings 
that were exchanged.230 The court stated: 
The parties seem to assume that only their writings could have 
formed a contract the CISG, however, explicitly states that [a] 
contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing 
and is not subject to any other requirement as to form. It may be 
proved by any means, including witnesses.
231
 225. Id.
 226. Id. at 108182. 
 227. See id. at 1082. 
 228. Id.
 229. See id. at 108182 
 230. See id. at 1083. 
 231. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 3, art. 11). 
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The court ultimately held that there were issues of material 
fact that precluded it from granting partial summary 
judgment to the plaintiffs.232
V. EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF THE CISG IS NOT NECESSARY 
FOR EFFECTIVE EXCLUSION
It might be tempting to assume that the only way to 
exclude application of the CISG is by doing so expressly 
and, at least when there is a written contract, in writing. 
Indeed, many U.S. courts have suggested that that is the 
case.233
A. No Writing Requirement 
In fact, including an express choiceoflaw clause 
accompanied by an explicit exclusion of the CISG that is 
clear, conspicuous, and in a writing signed by the parties is 
arguably the most desirable means of exclusion of the CISG. 
It leaves little room for doubt, and helps to establish at the 
 232. Id. 
 233. See, e.g., Forestal Guarani, S.A. v. Daros Intl, Inc., Civ. Action No. 03
4821 (JAG), 2008 WL 4560701, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2008) (The inclusion of an 
alternate choice of law provision must . . . be announced explicitly in the 
contract.) Easom II, No. 0614553, 2008 WL 1901236, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 
25, 2008) (Courts have held that parties can only opt out of the CISG if their 
contract explicitly states this fact. Since neither the Plaintiffs quote nor the 
Defendants Purchase Order contained an express provision opting out of the 
CISG, it is appropriate to apply it here.) (internal citations omitted) Sky Cast, 
Inc. v. Global Direct Distribution, LLC, Civil Action No. 07161JBT, 2008 WL 
754734, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2008) (Although the parties to a contract 
normally controlled by the CISG may exclude the applicability of the CISG to 
their contract, any such exclusion must be explicit.) Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of 
Am. v. SaintGobain Technical Fabrics Can. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1082 (D. 
Minn. 2007) (concluding that a choiceoflaw clause does not exclude the CISG 
absent an express statement that the CISG does not apply) Am. Mint LLC v. 
GOSoftware, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1:05CV650, 2006 WL 42090, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 
6, 2006) (concluding that the CISG was not excluded because the contract failed 
to expressly exclude the CISG by language which affirmatively states that it 
does not apply) St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, 
GmbH, No. 00 CIV. 9344(SHS), 2002 WL 465312, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) 
(reasoning that German law, and therefore the CISG, was the applicable body of 
law: (1) both the U.S. and Germany are Contracting States to [the CISG], and 
(2) neither party chose, by express provision in the contract, to opt out of the 
application of the CISG) (emphasis added). 
260 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
beginning of the relationship the body of law that will 
govern the contract and its interpretation in the event that 
a dispute arises after the parties are no longer interested in 
cooperating with each other.234 By making that choice before 
performance of the contract has commencedand before 
disputes have arisenthe parties make clear to each other 
and to third parties (including courts and other decision 
makers) their mutual intent to exclude application of the 
CISG. This helps to increase predictability and to avoid the 
transaction costs that could be incurred in connection with 
arguing at a later time about the application or exclusion of 
the CISG. 
Indeed, it is a good idea to include an express clause 
that makes the parties mutual intent clear, whether their 
intent is to exclude the CISG or for the CISG to apply.235 But 
it is important to note that the CISG does not require 
 234. Depending on the circumstances and the parties involved, a typical 
choiceoflaw clause in a contract governed by the laws of some jurisdiction 
within the United States when the parties have agreed to exclude application of 
the CISG might look something like the following: 
Choice of Law. THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY AND 
INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF [THE STATE OF 
______________], USA, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY PRINCIPLES 
PERTAINING TO CONFLICTS OF LAWS. HOWEVER, THE 1980 UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALE OF GOODS (CISG) SHALL NOT GOVERN OR APPLY TO THIS 
AGREEMENT OR ITS ENFORCEMENT OR TO ANY SALE MADE UNDER 
THIS AGREEMENT. THE PARTIES HEREBY EXCLUDE APPLICATION OF 
THE CISG. 
 235. Thus, depending once again on the circumstances and the parties 
involved, a typical choiceoflaw clause in a contract governed by the laws of 
some jurisdiction within the United States when the parties have agreed that 
the CISG will apply and will prevail over inconsistent domestic law might look 
something like the following: 
Choice of Law. THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY AND 
INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF 
GOODS (CISG) AND THE LAWS OF [THE STATE OF ______________], 
USA, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY PRINCIPLES PERTAINING TO 
CONFLICTS OF LAWS. FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBT, IT IS THE 
INTENT OF THE PARTIES THAT THE CISG SHALL GOVERN AND APPLY 
TO THIS AGREEMENT AND TO ANY AND ALL SALES MADE UNDER THIS 
AGREEMENT. IN THE EVENT OF ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CISG 
AND THE DOMESTIC LAWS OF [THE STATE OF ______________], THE 
CISG SHALL PREVAIL. 
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written exclusion of the CISG. In fact, Article 6 does not 
require any specific means of exclusion of the CISG. And 
Article 11 of the CISG specifically rejects any writing 
requirement and allows a contract to be proved by any 
means, including witnesses.236
B. Express Exclusion and the Travaux Préparatoires
The drafters considered four proposals to amend Article 
6 of the CISG that sought, in varying degrees, to address 
the requirement of express exclusion of the CISG.237 None 
was adopted. Two proposed amendments would have 
changed Article 6 to include a requirement for any 
attempted exclusion to be express in order to be effective. 
The first proposal, which was made by the Italian 
delegation, was to add a second paragraph to Article 6 that 
would have required any exclusion of the CISG to be 
express, although it would have permitted exclusion by 
means of a choiceoflaw clause selecting the laws of any 
country that is not a party to the CISG.238 Thus, the Italian 
proposal would have added as a new second paragraph: 
The Convention may only be excluded in its entirety where 
the parties have expressly so agreed or where they have 
chosen the law of a noncontracting State to govern their 
contract.239
And the second proposal, made by the Pakistani 
delegation, would have amended Article 6 simply to require 
exclusion to be express.240 Mr. Inaamullah of Pakistan 
 236. A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is 
not subject to any other requirement as to form. It may be proved by any means, 
including witnesses. CISG, supra note 3, art. 11. Article 29 of the CISG further 
demonstrates the CISGs emphasis on considering extrinsic evidence, including 
conduct of the parties, when identifying the terms of the parties agreement. See 
id., art. 29. Specifically, Article 29 provides that even when a written contract 
contains a provision requiring any modification or termination by agreement to 
be in writing, a party may be precluded by his conduct from asserting such a 
provision to the extent that the other party has relied on that conduct. Id., art. 
29(2). 
 237. Report of the First Committee, supra note 28, art. 5, ¶ 3, reprinted in 
Official Records, supra note 12, at 8586. 
 238. Id. ¶ 3(vii). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. ¶ 3(vi). Thus, Article 6 as amended by the Pakistani proposal would 
have provided as follows: The parties may expressly’ exclude the application 
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explained that his delegation felt that the existing text of 
Article 6 allowed the parties too much freedom and would 
lead to uncertainty, which could only be avoided by 
specifying that exclusion or variation should be the result of 
an express agreement between the parties.241 There were 
only four votes (out of more than forty) in favor of the 
Pakistani amendment.242
There was some modest support for amending Article 6 
in a way that would require exclusion of the CISG to be 
express in order to be effective. Mr. Wagner of East 
Germany said that parties might exclude application of the 
CISG in different ways, but any exclusion must be 
express.243 And Mr. Michida of Japan expressed concern that 
allowing implied exclusion of the CISG could encourage 
courts to conclude, on insufficient grounds, that the [CISG] 
had been entirely excluded.244
At the same time, however, there was a great deal of 
opposition to requiring exclusion of the CISG to be express, 
and the drafters ultimately rejected any requirement of 
express exclusion of the CISG, and objected to the notion 
that explicit exclusion of the CISG is necessary to exclude it 
effectively. Mr. Loewe of Austria, the Chairman of the First 
Committee, upon presenting the proposed amendments for 
consideration by the committee, stated that he considered 
that exclusion of the application of the Convention, 
derogation from its provisions or variation of their effect 
could be either express or implied, and that that was also 
apparently the conclusion which had emerged from the 
preparatory work.245
In fact, the two additional proposals to amend Article 6 
of the CISG that sought to address the requirement of 
express exclusion of the CISG specifically contemplated 
exclusion by means other than express means. 
of this Convention or, subject to article [12], derogate from or vary the effect of 
any of its provisions.
 241. Summary Records—4th Meeting, supra note 25, ¶ 8, reprinted in Official 
Records, supra note 12, at 249.  
 242. Report of the First Committee, supra note 28, art. 5, ¶ 6, reprinted in 
Official Records, supra note 12, at 86. 
 243. Id. at ¶ 15. 
 244. Id. at ¶ 18. 
 245. Id. at ¶ 4. 
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One of the additional proposals to amend Article 6, this 
one made by the Belgian delegation, would have required 
either express exclusion of the CISG or exclusion derived 
with certainty from the circumstances: Such exclusion, 
derogation or variation must be express or derive with 
certainty from the circumstances of the case.246 Thus, the 
Belgian proposal contemplated exclusion of the CISG by 
means other than express exclusion. However, the Belgian 
delegation sought to identify a standard for implied 
exclusion of the CISG. Mr. Dabin of Belgium explained that 
the Belgian proposal included a standard in order to 
constrain judges or other decision makers who might 
otherwise overstep their authority in determining that the 
CISG had been excluded: The Belgian proposal . . . 
provided that exclusion, derogation or variation must 
definitely result from the circumstances of the case, unless 
such measures were specifically provided for in writing, in 
order that the judge or arbitrator might be precluded from 
attributing to the parties an intention they did not have.247
Finally, the United Kingdom delegation proposed an 
amendment that would have amended Article 6 simply to 
make it clear that exclusion could be implied, by adding to 
Article 6 the following sentence: Such exclusion, derogation 
or variation may be express or implied.248 And a large 
number of representatives stated their view that exclusion 
of the CISG need not be express.249
Despite apparent widespread agreement (though not 
consensus) among the drafters that exclusion of the CISG 
would be possible by means other than express means, the 
 246. Report of the First Committee, supra note 28, art. 5, ¶ 3(v), reprinted in 
Official Records, supra note 12, at 85.  
 247. Summary Records—4th Meeting, supra note 25, ¶ 5, reprinted in Official 
Records, supra note 12, at 249. 
 248. Report of the First Committee, supra note 28, art. 5, ¶ 3(i), reprinted in 
Official Records, supra note 9, at 85.  
 249. Summary Records—4th Meeting, supra note 25, ¶ 9, reprinted in Official 
Records, supra note 12, at 249 (endorsement by the Australian representative of 
the UK proposal) id. ¶ 10 (expression of support by the U.S. representative for 
the UK proposal) id. ¶ 16 (expression of opposition by the West German 
representative to the Pakistani proposal because the proposal did not allow for 
the fact that business practice did not always take legal considerations into 
account at the time of concluding contracts.) id. ¶ 17 (expression of support by 
the Swedish representative for the UK proposal). 
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drafters were unable to reach agreement on how specifically 
to amend Article 6 to reflect that general agreement. 
Ultimately the drafters did not go so far as to add a 
statement that exclusion could be implied. In fact, the 
UNCITRAL working group responsible for preparing the 
draft CISG specifically removed from the draft of Article 6 
the words such exclusion may be express or implied, which 
had appeared in a predecessor convention.250 And the United 
Kingdom proposal to reintroduce that sentence was rejected 
as well, with twelve votes in favor of the amendment, 
nineteen opposed to it, and a large number of abstentions.251
It is curious that the drafters would reject the 
amendment proposed by the delegation of the United 
Kingdom. Of course the small minority of representatives 
who favored a requirement of any exclusion to be express 
would oppose the amendment proposed by the United 
Kingdom. But that can account for only a fraction of the 
nineteen votes opposed to the amendment.  
One might draw the conclusion that a majority of the 
drafters did not intend for parties to be able to exclude 
application of the CISG by implied means. But such a 
conclusion is neither consistent with the text of the CISG, 
nor supported by the travaux préparatoires. Instead, it 
seems that those drafters who agreed that Article 6 should 
be amended to reflect their understanding that exclusion 
need not be express were unable to agree as to how Article 6 
should be amended to reflect that understanding. And the 
existing text of Article 6 was sufficient to support their 
understanding that exclusion of the CISG need not be 
express. 
The travaux préparatoires offer another explanation for 
some of the opposition to the proposed amendment. 
Specifically, Mr. Rognlien of Norway said that he was in 
favor of retaining the existing text (that is, the current text) 
of Article 6, because in his view the existing text already 
meant that exclusion or derogation could be express or tacit, 
making the United Kingdom amendment unnecessary.252
 250. Id. ¶ 5 (in a statement by Mr. Dabin of Belgium). 
 251. Report of the First Committee, supra note 28, art. 5, ¶ 6, reprinted in 
Official Records, supra note 12, at 86.  
 252. See Summary Records—4th Meeting, supra note 25, ¶ 11, reprinted in 
Official Records, supra note 12, at 249. 
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And in his view, the proposed amendment was not only 
unnecessary, it was undesirable as well, because he was 
concerned that by including in Article 6 a statement that 
exclusion of the CISG could be express or implied, all of the 
remaining provisions of the CISG might be interpreted 
restrictively, such that any agreement on a particular point 
between the parties to a contract covered by the CISG 
would have to be express: 
Mr. ROGNLIEN (Norway) said that he was in favour of retaining 
the existing text which, in his view, meant that derogation might 
be express or tacit. If one or other of the additions to [Article 6] 
proposed by the United Kingdom or Belgium were adopted, it 
might be deduced a contrario that other provisions of the 
Convention were to be interpreted in a restrictive sense.
253
It appears from the travaux préparatoires that other 
representatives shared the concern expressed by Mr. 
Rognlien. For example, in direct reply to Mr. Rognliens 
comments, Mr. Khoo Leang Huat of Singapore said he, too, 
was in favor of keeping the existing text.254 And other 
representatives had previously expressed their view that 
the proposed amendment was simply unnecessary, though 
they agreed with the idea of allowing implied exclusion. For 
example, Mr. Farnsworth of the United States said that he 
could see no reason why the existing text of [Article 6] 
should not be retained, although he would be able to 
support the United Kingdom proposal . . . .255
Ultimately, none of the proposed amendments was 
accepted, and the existing text remained unchanged. As a 
result, Article 6 as finally adopted requires no specific 
means of exclusion and does not establish a standard for 
exclusion. 
Because the CISG does not specify any particular 
means of exclusion of the CISG, courts and other decision 
makers are required by Article 8, Section 3 of the CISG to 
consider all relevant circumstances when attempting to 
determine the parties intent, including as relates to their 
mutual intent to exclude application of the CISG. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. ¶ 12. 
 255. Id. ¶ 10. 
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VI. ARTICLE 8THE MISSING LINK
A. Determining Party Intent 
Even if a court (i) concludes that a contract would be 
governed by the CISG due to the nature of the sale of goods 
and the location of the contracting parties and (ii) finds that 
the agreement does not exclude application of the CISG 
under Article 6 of the CISG, either because there is no 
choiceoflaw clause at all or there is a choiceoflaw clause 
choosing the laws of a state within the United States to 
govern the agreement but silent on the application of the 
CISG, the analysis concerning determination of the 
applicable body of law is not yet complete. At that point in 
the courts analysis, the CISG applies to the contract. 
Because the CISG is the applicable body of law at that 
point, Article 8 is relevant for the courts continuing 
analysis. Article 8 calls on the court to look beyond the four 
corners of any written agreement to determine the parties 
intent. Courts have largely failed to consider this aspect of 
the analysis in the analysis of exclusion of the CISG that 
has taken place, and it is this aspect of the analysis that 
requires a paradigmatic shift on the part of U.S. courts. 
Article 8 of the CISG provides as follows: 
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and 
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his 
intent where the other party knew or could not have been 
unaware what that intent was. 
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made 
by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to 
the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as 
the other party would have had in the same circumstances. 
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a 
reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be 
given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the 
negotiations, any practices which the parties have established 
between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the 
parties.
256
Under Article 8, Section 1, a partys statements and 
conduct are to be interpreted in accordance with their 
 256. CISG, supra note 3, art. 8. 
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actual intent whenever the other party knows that intent or 
could not have been unaware of it.257 The reasonable 
understanding of a partys statements and conductor 
objective intentonly becomes relevant under Article 8, 
Section 2 if the actual intentor subjective intentcannot 
be determined under Article 8, Section 1.258 In other words, 
a partys actual intent, if it is known by the other party, 
prevails over a different objective intent that would 
otherwise be attributed to the partys statements or 
conduct. 
Under Article 8, Section 3, the court must give due 
consideration to all relevant circumstances of the case, 
including but not limited to the parties negotiations, any 
practices between the parties, and the parties conduct 
following formation of the contract in order to determine the 
intent of the partiessubjective intent or objective intent.259
In other words, each party must be given the opportunity to 
show that the parties agreed, outside of the four corners of 
the written agreement, upon an actual understanding of 
their words that is inconsistent with the objective 
understanding that would otherwise be attributable to those 
words. This is a significant departure from the U.S. legal 
tradition, which emphasizes the objective understanding 
that would be given to the parties words260 and which would 
preclude introduction of parol evidence that would 
contradict the written agreement.261
It is therefore possible that the parties enter into a 
robust written contract, signed by both parties, that is silent 
on the application of the CISG, or that even expressly 
provides for the CISG to apply. And it is possible that a 
party to the contract might seek to introduce extrinsic 
 257. Id. art. 8(1). 
 258. See id. art. 8(2). 
 259. See id. art. 8(3). 
 260. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981) (A promise 
is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so 
made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been 
made.) see also id. § 2 cmt. b. (Many contract disputes arise because different 
people attach different meanings to the same words and conduct. The phrase 
manifestation of intention adopts an external or objective standard for 
interpreting conduct it means the external expression of intention as 
distinguished from undisclosed intention.).
 261. See, e.g., id. § 213 U.C.C. § 2202 (2002). 
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evidence tending to show that the parties nevertheless 
agreed outside the four corners of their agreement that the 
CISG would not govern their transaction. While the parol 
evidence rule of the UCC would specifically preclude the 
possibility of such a showing when the writing is a complete 
and exclusive statement of the parties agreement, and 
would limit it even when the writing is not complete and 
exclusive if it is nevertheless a final expression of the 
parties agreement,262 Article 8 of the CISG specifically calls 
for the possibility of showing such intent. The writing is not 
dispositive of the parties intent.
Some commentators have argued that Article 8, Section 
3 deals only with interpretation of the parties agreement 
and that the impact of Article 8, Section 3 on parol evidence 
issues is therefore limited.263 That view of the CISG appears 
to be grounded in a bias for the sanctity of the written 
contract that inheres in the U.S. legal tradition.264 While the 
CISG reflects the influence of the U.S. legal tradition in 
many ways, the CISG is not the same in every respect. The 
text of Article 8 shows that courts must defer to a partys 
actual intentwhen that actual intent can be determined 
and it can be shown that the other party knew or could not 
have been unaware of it. Moreover, courts must consider 
extrinsic evidence in their determination of that intent. 
The travaux préparatoires offer support for this as well. 
This view was expressed by Mr. Rognlien of Norway, who 
said that [t]he determining factor must always be the 
intention of the parties at the moment of concluding the 
 262. See U.C.C. § 2202 (2002). 
 263. Ronald A. Brand & Harry M. Flechtner, Arbitration and Contract 
Formation in International Trade: First Interpretations of the U.N. Sales 
Convention, 12 J.L. & COM. 239, 25152 (1993). 
 264. One challenge relating to implementation of the CISG in general is that 
courts in different countries and in different legal systems might interpret 
provisions of the CISG in a way that reflects the courts own legal traditions 
more than the text of the CISG and the purposes underlying it. This tendency 
has been identified as a homeward trend. See Harry Flechtner, Article 79 of 
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) as Rorschach Test: The Homeward Trend and Exemption for Delivering 
NonConforming Goods, 19 PACE INTL L. REV. 29, 3031 (2007). 
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contract, whether or not such intention had been express or 
implied in [Article 8].265
Nevertheless, U.S. courts largely have not 
acknowledged this aspect of the analysis when determining 
whether the CISG has been excluded, perhaps because 
there was no real dispute regarding application of the CISG 
perhaps because neither party offered evidence of other 
relevant circumstances to show a contrary intent or 
perhaps because courts and litigants alike, influenced by 
U.S. legal traditions, have not considered that the 
additional analysis is appropriateindeed, necessary
under the CISG. But, as noted by the Eleventh Circuit, 
[w]e may only achieve the directives of good faith and 
uniformity in contracts under the CISG by interpreting and 
applying the plain language of article 8(3) as written and 
obeying its directive to consider extrinsic evidence.266
B. U.S. Courts Applying an Article 8 Analysis 
Even though courts have not explicitly recognized that 
Article 8 of the CISG may require additional analysis 
beyond looking simply at the four corners of the written 
agreement to determine whether the CISG has been 
excluded by the parties, some U.S. courts have recognized 
the importance of Article 8 in determining the parties 
intent for other purposes.267 In addition, at least one court 
has engaged in the sort of analysis that is contemplated by 
Article 8 in the courts determination of whether or not the 
parties had excluded the CISG.268
 265. Summary Records—4th Meeting, supra note 25, ¶ 11, reprinted in Official 
Records, supra note 12, at 249.
 266. MCCMarble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova DAgostino, S.p.A., 
144 F.3d 1384, 1391 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 267. See generally Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabaté USA Inc., 328 
F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2003) MCCMarble Ceramic Center, Inc., 144 F.3d at 1384 
ECEM European Chem. Mktg. B.V. v. Purolite Co., Civ. Action No. 053078, 
2010 WL 419444 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010) TeeVee Toons, Inc., v. Gerhard 
Schubert GmbH, No. 00 Civ. 5189(RCC), 2006 WL 2463537 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 
2006) Mitchell Aircraft Spares, Inc. v. European Aircraft Serv. AB, 23 F. Supp. 
2d 915 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
 268. See OrthoTec, LLC v. Eurosurgical, S.A., Nos. B179387, B189213, 2007 
WL 1830810, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 27, 2007). 
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The Ninth Circuit recognized the important role of 
Article 8, Section 3 of the CISG.269 In Chateau des Charmes 
Wines Ltd. v. Sabaté USA Inc., Chateau des Charmes Ltd., 
a Canadian company and the plaintiff, entered into a 
contract to purchase wine corks from a French company, 
Sabaté, S.A., and its U.S. subsidiary, Sabaté USA, Inc.270
Chateau des Charmes and Sabaté USA entered into an oral 
agreement by telephone for the supply of a specified 
quantity of wine corks at a specified price and with agreed
upon payment and shipping terms.271 The parties 
subsequently entered into a second oral agreement for 
additional wine corks, substantially on the same terms.272
Sabaté France shipped the corks in eleven shipments and 
sent corresponding written invoices for the shipments the 
written invoices included, among other terms, a forum 
selection clause providing for resolution of disputes in 
France.273
Chateau des Charmes subsequently realized that wine 
bottled using the Sabaté wine corks was tainted, and it filed 
suit in California against Sabaté USA and Sabaté France.274
Sabaté USA and Sabaté France moved to dismiss Chateau’s 
complaint based on the forum selection clause contained in 
the invoices.275 The federal district court granted the motion, 
finding that the forum selection clause was part of the 
agreement between the parties.276 Chateau des Charmes 
appealed.277
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by determining 
that the CISG governed the substantive question of contract 
formation as to the forum selection clause.278 The court 
noted that international sales of goods like those at issue in 
this case “are ordinarily governed by a multilateral treaty, 
 269. Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd., 328 F.3d at 528. 
 270. Id. at 529. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See id.
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at 530. 
 276. Id.
 277. Id. 
 278. Id.
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the [CISG], which applies to ‘contracts of sale of goods 
between parties whose places of business are in different 
States . . . when the States are Contracting States.’”279
After determining that the CISG applied to the 
transactions, the court concluded that the forum selection 
clauses were not part of any agreement between the 
parties.280 The court reasoned that the CISG provides that 
contracts for the sale of goods that are governed by the 
CISG “need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing. . . 
.”281 The court then analyzed contract formation under 
Articles 14, 18, and 23 of the CISG and concluded that the 
oral agreements between the parties “were sufficient to 
create complete and binding contracts,” and the oral 
agreements contained no forum selection clause.282 Thus, the 
forum selection clause was not part of the oral agreement 
between the parties.283
Importantly, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that even 
though it was clear that the oral agreements formed binding 
and complete contracts, its analysis was not yet complete.284
The court quoted Article 8, Section 3 of the CISG, 
recognizing that it was appropriate for the court to consider 
“all relevant circumstances” to determine whether Chateau 
des Charmes nevertheless agreed to the terms of the Sabaté 
invoices.285 But the court concluded that no circumstances 
existed that led to the conclusion that Chateau des 
 279. Id. at 530 (quoting CISG, supra note 3, art. 1(1)(a)). 
 280. Id. at 531. 
 281. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 3, art. 11). 
 282. Id. 
 283. In reaching its conclusion that the oral agreements were complete and 
binding, the court specifically noted that the outcome under the CISG is 
different from the outcome that would likely have been appropriate under 
Article 2 of the UCC. Id. at 531 n.3 (citing U.C.C. § 2201 (2002)). Specifically, 
the statute of frauds under Article 2 of the UCC “would require a contract for 
the sale of corks for the value involved here to be evidenced by a writing.” Id. 
Notably, however, the UCC statute of frauds creates an exception when goods 
have been delivered and accepted and when payment has been made and 
accepted, such that the statute of frauds likely would not have provided a 
defense against enforcement of the oral agreements. U.C.C. § 2201(3) (2002). 
 284. See Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd., 328 F.3d at 531. 
 285. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 3, art. 8(3)). 
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Charmes’ conduct evidenced any agreement to the forum 
selection clause, and the court reversed the district court.286
This method is the sort of analysis that a court should 
use under Article 8 of the CISG. In this case, it was not a 
stretch for the court to consider “all relevant circumstances” 
because there was no signed agreement. But Article 8, 
Section 3 applies even when there is a signed agreement. To 
be sure, the signed agreement itself is arguably the best 
evidence of the parties’ intent, in particular when the signed 
agreement is negotiated and entered into by merchants or 
other sophisticated parties. But it is not necessarily the only 
evidence of the parties’ intent. Some U.S. courts have 
recognized this and have applied Article 8 even when there 
is a written agreement. 
C. Use of Article 8 by U.S. Courts When There is a Writing 
The Eleventh Circuit conducted analysis under Article 
8, Section 3 of the CISG in its decision in MCCMarble 
Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, 
S.p.A.287 The dispute arose out of an arrangement for the 
sale of ceramic tiles by an Italian ceramic tile producer, 
Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, S.p.A., to a U.S. buyer, MCC
Marble Ceramic Center, Inc.288 MCC’s president met 
representatives of D’Agostino and saw sample product at a 
trade show in Bologna, Italy.289 The parties reached an oral 
agreement at the trade show for the purchase and sale of 
some shipments of ceramic tiles, agreeing on price, quality, 
quantity, delivery, and payment.290 Their oral 
understanding was then memorialized on a preprinted 
standard D’Agostino sales form, which also contained 
D’Agostino’s standard terms and conditions of sale (in 
Italian), which MCC’s president signed.291
In addition to the oral agreement struck at the trade 
show, MCC claimed that the parties subsequently entered 
 286. Id. at 53132. 
 287. 144 F.3d at 1384. 
 288. Id. at 1385. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
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into a requirements contract.292 MCC brought a claim under 
the requirements contract, claiming breach when 
D’Agostino failed to fill certain orders placed by MCC.293
D’Agostino claimed that it was not obligated to do so 
because MCC was in payment default, and the D’Agostino 
standard terms and conditions of sale gave D’Agostino the 
right to suspend its performance or cancel the agreement 
with MCC altogether in the event of payment default.294
D’Agostino counterclaimed, seeking damages for 
nonpayment.295
MCC argued that the parties actually intended that the 
fine print of the D’Agostino form would not apply.296 MCC 
submitted three affidavits to that effect, including the 
affidavits of two D’Agostino sales representatives.297 But, 
deferring to the signed agreement, the district court applied 
the parol evidence rule and held that the affidavits, even if 
they were true, did not raise any issue of material fact 
regarding the applicability or terms of the written contract 
that had been signed by the MCC president.298 MCC 
appealed.299
The parties agreed that the CISG governed the 
dispute.300 MCC argued on appeal that, by applying the 
parol evidence rule, the district court improperly ignored 
evidence that it should have considered under the CISG.301
The Eleventh Circuit stated that the CISG “appears to 
permit a substantial inquiry into the parties’ subjective 
intent, even if the parties did not engage in any objectively 
ascertainable means of registering the intent.”302 Looking 
carefully at the text of Article 8 of the CISG, the court 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 138586. 
 295. Id. at 1386. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. See id.
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 1387. 
 302. Id. 
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reasoned that the plain language of the CISG “requires an 
inquiry into a party’s subjective intent as long as the other 
party to the contract was aware of this intent.”303 The court 
considered whether the parol evidence rule changes that 
result and concluded that it did not.304 The court stated that 
the CISG contains no express statement on the role of parol 
evidence.305 On the contrary, Article 8, Section 3 expressly 
directs courts to give due consideration to all relevant 
circumstances of the case, including the negotiations, in 
order to determine the parties’ intent.306 In light of Article 8, 
Section 1’s focus on the subjective intent of the parties, the 
court concluded that Article 8, Section 3 is “a clear 
instruction to admit and consider parol evidence regarding 
the negotiations to the extent they reveal the parties’ 
subjective intent.”307
The court reasoned that its conclusion was supported by 
one of the key factors behind the CISG, which was “to 
provide parties to international contracts for the sale of 
goods with some degree of certainty as to the principles of 
law that would govern potential disputes and remove the 
previous doubt regarding which party’s legal system might 
otherwise apply.”308 The court concluded that it can “only 
achieve the directives of good faith and uniformity in 
contracts under the CISG by interpreting and applying the 
plain language of article 8, Section 3 as written and obeying 
its directive to consider this type of parol evidence.”309
In short, the Eleventh Circuit conducted a careful 
analysis of the CISG, refraining from succumbing to the 
temptation to simply conclude that legal principles that are 
part of the U.S. legal tradition automatically guide the 
court’s analysis. The court’s analysis offers a good example 
 303. Id.
 304. See id. at 138891. 
 305. Id. at 1389. 
 306. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 3, art. 8(3)). 
 307. Id.
 308. Id. at 1391. 
 309. Id.
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of a U.S. court suspending its assumptions and doing the 
difficult work necessary to properly apply the CISG.310
Other U.S. courts have similarly suspended traditional 
legal doctrines in deference to Article 8 of the CISG, even 
when a writing was present. Recently, a federal district 
court in Pennsylvania applied Article 8 effectively in its 
analysis.311 In ECEM European Chemical Marketing B.V., 
Purolite Company, an international company with its 
principal place of business in the United States, was a 
manufacturer of ion exchange resins and polymers.312
Styrene monomer was an essential ingredient in Purolite’s 
products.313 ECEM European Chemical Marketing B.V., a 
Dutch company, was a purchaser and reseller of styrene.314
Beginning in 2002, Purolite and ECEM entered into a series 
of agreements for the supply by ECEM to Purolite of 
styrene for Purolite’s use in the production of its products.315
The case before the court resulted from Purolite’s failure to 
pay for five shipments of styrene received in the final 
quarter of 2004, which were delivered by ECEM pursuant to 
a Purolite purchase order for the year 2004, which ECEM 
had accepted.316 The 2004 purchase order was modified by 
the parties in connection with continuing use of a railcar 
 310. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the court’s scrupulous, careful analysis of 
the text of the CISG, the court then stated in dicta that, “to the extent parties 
wish to avoid parol evidence problems they can do so by including a merger 
clause in their agreement that extinguishes any and all prior agreements and 
understandings not expressed in the writing.” Id. at 1391. While such a merger 
clause should be given weight in a court’s analysis and might very well have the 
effect of excluding parol evidence in most cases, it is plausible that a written 
agreement, especially a standard form contract, could include such a clause but 
that the conduct of the parties or other extrinsic evidence could belie any intent 
for the clause to govern the agreement between the parties. See, e.g., TeeVee 
Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, No. 00 Civ. 5189(RCC), 2006 WL 
2463537, at *89 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2006), discussed in Part VII. 
 311. See ECEM European Chemical Mktg. B.V. v. Purolite Co., Civ. Action No. 
053078, 2010 WL 419444 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010). 
 312. Id. at *1. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id.
 315. Id.
 316. Id. at *2. 
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through March 2005, but the parties disputed precisely how 
the 2004 purchase order was modified.317
Before the court were five motions in limine, two filed 
by ECEM and three filed by Purolite.318 Two of Purolite’s 
motions in limine are relevant for this analysis: to bar the 
use of ECEM’s standard Terms and Conditions of Sale, and 
to exclude evidence of prior negotiations leading up to the 
2004 purchase order, as well as evidence that the purchase 
order was not accepted and binding.319 Purolite sought to 
exclude the evidence by means of the parol evidence rule.320
Purolite’s argument was that the 2004 purchase order 
that had been prepared by Purolite and accepted by ECEM 
was the entire agreement between the parties, and ECEM’s 
terms and conditions of sale could not vary, alter, or modify 
the terms of the purchase order.321 But ECEM argued that 
the terms and conditions were part of the agreement 
between the parties and maintained that each shipment of 
styrene contained an ECEM invoice that incorporated by 
reference the ECEM terms and conditions of sale.322
In denying Purolite’s motion, the court applied Article 8 
of the CISG.323 Purolite argued that, because Purolite was 
“objectively unaware” of ECEM’s intent to incorporate the 
terms and conditions of sale into the parties’ agreement, the 
case should be governed by the interplay between Article 8, 
Sections 2 and 3 of the CISG, which, Purolite argued, 
should limit the court to objective, rather than subjective, 
evidence of the parties’ conduct.324 The court rejected that 
argument, concluding that it did not matter whether 
Section 1 or 2 of Article 8 was applicable, because, in either 
case, the CISG would allow evidence of the parties’ intent to 
be admitted and considered to interpret the terms of the 
agreement and that “Article 8(3) requires due consideration 
 317. Id. at *23 
 318. Id. at *1. 
 319. Id.
 320. See id. at *1012, *14. 
 321. Id. at *10. 
 322. See id. at *11. 
 323. See id. at *1113. 
 324. Id. at *12. 
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to be given to all relevant circumstances regardless of 
whether Article 8(1) or 8(2) applies.”325
Applying the same reasoning, the court also denied 
Purolite’s motion in limine to preclude ECEM from 
introducing parol evidence consisting of negotiations prior 
to the execution of the purchase order.326
Similarly, in Mitchell Aircraft Spares, Inc. v. European 
Aircraft Service AB,327 an early CISG decision by a federal 
court, Mitchell Aircraft Spares, Inc., a U.S. company with 
its principal place of business in Illinois, filed suit against 
European Aircraft Service AB (“EAS”), a Swedish company 
with its principal place of business in Sweden, for breach of 
contract and breach of warranty under an agreement 
between the parties by which EAS was to sell aircraft parts 
to Mitchell.328 Specifically, EAS agreed to sell three 
integrated drive generators, (“IDGs”).329 Mitchell issued a 
purchase order describing the IDGs by name and by part 
number.330 EAS issued an invoice in response, and the 
invoice referred to the same IDGs by name and by the same 
part number.331 However, EAS shipped the IDGs, and 
Mitchell discovered that the IDGs that were delivered by 
EAS were, in fact, of a different part number.332 Mitchell 
alleged damages of $120,000 as a consequence of the alleged 
breach by EAS for failure to supply IDGs of the correct part 
number and filed a claim against EAS.333
Before the court was Mitchell’s motion for summary 
judgment, as well as EAS’s crossmotion for a determination 
of applicable law.334 EAS argued that the CISG governed the 
contract (but not its formation), and Mitchell did not dispute 
 325. Id. at *13. 
 326. Id. at *14. 
 327. 23 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
 328. Id. at 916. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. at 917. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. at 918. 
 333. See id. 
 334. Id.
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that position.335 The court concluded that, because the 
parties had their respective places of business in the United 
States and Sweden, both of which have ratified the CISG, 
the CISG governed the contract.336
With respect to Mitchell’s breach of contract claim, 
Mitchell argued that the parties contracted for EAS to sell 
Mitchell three IDGs bearing a specific part number and that 
EAS breached the contract when it sold Mitchell IDGs 
which were not the correct part number.337 EAS, on the 
other hand, argued that the parties had simply contracted 
for EAS to sell Mitchell the three IDGS that EAS had 
available for sale and not IDGs bearing any particular part 
number, notwithstanding the express terms of the order 
documents.338
Looking at the plain language in the documents 
exchanged by the parties, it would be possible to conclude 
that the objective manifestation of the parties’ intent was 
that there was agreement for EAS to sell three IDGs 
bearing the particular part number identified in the order 
documents.339 But in applying the CISG, the court stated 
that it was necessary to determine whether it could consider 
parol evidence.340 The court concluded that “article 8 of the 
CISG requires the court to consider parol evidence 
inasmuch as that evidence is probative of the subjective 
intent of the parties.”341 The court concluded that: 
[I]t must consider any evidence concerning any negotiations, 
agreements, or statements made prior to the issuance of the 
purchase order in this case in determining whether the 
parties contracted for EAS to sell Mitchell three IDGs part 
 335. See id. 
 336. Id. see CISG, supra note 3, art. 92(1). The CISG did not govern issues of 
contract formation, however, because “Sweden declared in its instrument of 
ratification that it would not be bound by Part II” (Formation of the contract), a 
declaration that is expressly permitted by the CISG. Mitchell Aircraft Spares, 
Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d at 915, 918.  
 337. Id. at 919. 
 338. Id. 
 339. See id. at 917, 919 
 340. Id. at 919 
 341. Id. at 920. 
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number 729640 or, alternatively, to sell Mitchell the three 
IDGs that EAS had available for purchase.
342
In considering parol evidence, the court concluded that 
there was a genuine issue of material fact which precluded 
summary judgment.343
Thus, the court recognized the important role Article 8 
plays in determining the agreement between the parties. In 
this case, Article 8 played a role in determining the precise 
nature of the parts to be sold. But the same concept would 
also apply to determining whether the parties intended to 
exclude application of the CISG. 
There are other decisions that show that U.S. courts are 
willing and able to conduct an appropriate Article 8 
analysis, even when there is a writing present. In Alpha 
Prime Development Corp. v. Holland Loader Co., LLC, the 
court reasoned that “[t]he text of and commentary to the 
CISG show that a writing between the parties is not 
conclusive of the terms of their agreement.”344 And the court 
stated that, under the CISG, testimony of the parties may 
even contradict the written terms of an agreement.345
Similarly, in TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, 
the court concluded that evidence of the parties’ conduct 
could belie the terms of a written agreement signed by both 
parties.346 And as noted in Part V.D, supra, the court in 
Travelers Property Casualty Company recognized that, 
despite the presence of writings exchanged by the parties 
which could have formed a contract, it was appropriate also 
to consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether an oral 
contract had formed.347
 342. Id.
 343. Id. at 92122. 
 344. Alpha Prime Dev. Corp. v. Holland Loader Co., LLC, Civ. Action No. 09
cv01763WYDKMT, 2010 WL 2691774, at *4 (D. Colo. July 6, 2010). 
 345. Id. at *5 see also Larry A. DiMatteo, An International Contract Law 
Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions Plus the 
Internationalization Of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 
L = (ii)2, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 67, 109 (1997). 
 346. No. 00 Civ. 5189(RCC), 2006 WL 2463537, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2006). 
 347. See Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. SaintGobain Technical Fabrics 
Can. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083 (D. Minn. 2007). 
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D. Objective Intent is Still Relevant 
As U.S. courts begin to develop jurisprudence using the 
method of analysis prescribed by Article 8 of the CISG, 
there is a risk of going too far, and emphasizing 
determination of subjective intent more than is called for by 
Article 8. 
In TeeVee Toons, Inc., a federal court concluded that it 
was appropriate to consider parol evidence not only when 
there was a signed, written agreement between the parties, 
but even when that signed, written agreement contained a 
merger clause.348 In that case, TeeVee Toons, Inc. (“TVT”), a 
U.S. company, entered into a written agreement with 
Gerhard Schubert GmbH, a German company, under which 
Schubert would supply TVT with a system for the 
production of TVT’s packaging product.349 Not long after 
that, the parties began to experience problems with 
Schubert’s performance350—“Schubert experienced delays 
that set the project back nearly two years,” and when the 
system was finally delivered, it “malfunctioned frequently 
and severely.”351 TVT (and an affiliate of TVT) later brought 
an action against Schubert, asserting contract and tort 
claims.352 The claims survived Schubert’s motion to dismiss, 
and before the court in this decision was Schubert’s motion 
for summary judgment.353
The court concluded that the CISG governed TVT’s 
breach of contract claims, which arose under Articles 35 and 
36 of the CISG.354 But Schubert argued that Article 35 
warranties had been disclaimed by the plain language of its 
“Terms and Conditions” that were attached to the written 
contract signed by both parties.355 TVT argued that there 
was an “express oral understanding” between the parties 
 348. See TeeVee Toons, Inc., 2006 WL 2463537, at *8. 
 349. Id. at *1. 
 350. See id. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. at *45. 
 355. Id. at *6. 
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that boilerplate language of the Terms and Conditions had 
been excluded from the agreement.356
The court noted that Article 11 of the CISG does away 
with the statute of frauds and provides that an agreement 
may be proved by any means, including oral statements 
between the parties.357 And the court continued by noting 
that Article 8 of the CISG explains the process of 
interpreting oral statements.358 The court concluded that 
under the CISG, “any statements made between Schubert 
and TVT that contradicted the written ‘Terms and 
Conditions’ . . . must be considered in deciding what is part 
of the [agreement].”359 Enough evidence was introduced to 
raise a genuine factual question regarding whether 
Schubert, through its agent, “‘could not have been unaware’ 
that TVT was interpreting his words and conduct as doing 
away with the boilerplate ‘Terms and Conditions’.”360
The court further noted that the matter was 
complicated by the inclusion in the Terms and Conditions of 
a merger clause purporting to extinguish all prior oral 
agreements.361 The merger clause offered evidence that the 
parties intended to exclude consideration of extrinsic 
evidence, yet TVT was proposing to use extrinsic evidence to 
show that the Terms and Conditions, including the merger 
clause, were not intended to govern the agreement between 
the parties.362 The court concluded that “only if both 
Schubert and TVT shared the intent to be bound by the 
Merger Clause contained in the ‘Terms and Conditions’ is 
the Merger Clause operative.”363 And the court stated that if 
there was no “shared intent” of both TVT and Schubert to 
be bound by either the Terms and Conditions or the merger 
clause itself, “then the ‘Terms and Conditions’ section and 
Merger Clause would drop out, and TVT would be entitled 
 356. Id.
 357. Id. at *7 (citing CISG, supra note 3, at 11). 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. at *8. 
 362. See id. at *79. 
 363. Id. at *8. 
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to the full panoply of implied warranties offered by the 
CISG . . . .”364
While the court’s attention to Article 8 is laudable, and 
while the ultimate conclusion reached by the court that 
summary judgment was not yet appropriate was arguably 
the correct conclusion, the court appears to have misstated 
the appropriate standard for determining whether or not 
the merger clause and the Terms and Conditions were part 
of the agreement between the parties. Because there was a 
written agreement signed by both parties that incorporated 
the Terms and Conditions, there was strong evidence of the 
intent of the parties to be bound by those Terms and 
Conditions. Under Article 8, TVT could attempt to show 
that the parties had a different actual intentthat is, that 
the parties actually intended not to be bound by the Terms 
and Conditions. But under Article 8, Section 1, TVT must 
show that Schubert either knew or could not have been 
unaware of that alternative actual intent.365 True, TVT 
ought to be able to use under Article 8, Section 3 all 
relevant circumstances of the case, but TVT still must bear 
its burden of showing that it had such intent and that 
Schubert was aware of that intent or could not have been 
unaware of it. If TVT were unable to show that, then Article 
8, Section 2 should govern when Article 8, Section 1 is not 
applicable, statements made by and other conduct of a party 
are to be interpreted according to the understanding that a 
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would 
have had in the same circumstances.366 And the signed, 
written agreement should therefore be enforced in 
accordance with the objective understanding of its terms (to 
the extent those terms are enforceable). 
The court in TeeVee Toons seems to have misunderstood 
this aspect of Article 8, improperly imposing a requirement 
that Schubert show that the parties shared an intent to be 
bound by the Terms and Conditions before the court would 
conclude that the Terms and Conditions were part of the 
agreement. 
The court in TeeVee Toons stated that the finder of fact 
would be required to determine the subjective intent of both 
 364. Id. 
 365. CISG, supra note 3, art. 8(1). 
 366. Id. art. 8(2). 
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parties at the time Schuberts offer was accepted by 
TVT.367 But the fact finder is not required under the CISG 
to make such a determination. The CISG does not compel 
the fact finder to determine subjective intent rather, the 
CISG requires the court to consider a broad range of 
evidence in determining the parties intent and calls for 
subjective intent to prevail over objective intent, when 
applicable.368
This is an important distinction that the TeeVee Toons
decision failed to make. If subjective intent is determinable, 
it should prevail. But if subjective intent is not 
determinable, it is certainly not automatically the case that 
a signed agreement would not be enforceable. Rather, the 
signed written agreement offers what is arguably the best 
objective evidence of the intent of the parties. Unless 
subjective intent is established by one of the parties to 
overcome the signed written agreement, the objective intent 
should govern and the signed written agreement should be 
enforced. 
E. Exclusion of the CISG under Article 8—The OrthoTec
decision 
At least one court has engaged in the sort of analysis 
contemplated by Article 8 of the CISG in analyzing 
exclusion of the CISG, though without clear reference to 
Article 8.369 The dispute between the parties in OrthoTec
arose out of a complex set of arrangements between 
Eurosurgical, S.A., a French corporation and the owner of 
surgical technology, and OrthoTec, Inc., a U.S. company.370
OrthoTec was Eurosurgicals agent in the United States, 
and the relationship between Eurosurgical and OrthoTec 
involved both licensing and agency arrangements.371
Subsequently, the original OrthoTec entity organized a 
limited liability company, and Eurosurgical was granted 
 367. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 2006 WL 2463537, at *9. 
 368. CISG, supra note 3, art. 8. 
 369. See OrthoTec, LLC v. Eurosurgical, S.A., Nos. B179387, B189213, 2007 
WL 1830810, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 27, 2007). 
 370. Id. at *1. 
 371. See id. at *12. 
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membership units in it.372 The assignment agreement that 
was used to transfer rights to the limited liability company 
expanded those rights at the same time that it granted 
Eurosurgical an interest in the limited liability company.373
The assignment agreement provided that it was governed 
by California law.374
In time, OrthoTec came to work with REO SpineLine as 
U.S. distributor of the licensed products, and the products 
became very profitable.375 OrthoTec, Eurosurgical, and REO 
SpineLine contemplated a merger, but the merger never 
materialized, and the relationship between Eurosurgical 
and OrthoTec soured.376 Eventually, Eurosurgical wished to 
sell directly to REO SpineLine without OrthoTecs 
involvement, and Eurosurgical proceeded to terminate its 
relationship with OrthoTec.377 Termination of OrthoTecs 
rights and agency resulted in a variety of claims against 
Eurosurgical, and Eurosurgical responded with its own 
counterclaims.378
The claims were heard by a jury, and the jury returned 
a verdict for OrthoTec.379 Eurosurgical had requested a 
series of jury instructions on the CISG, but the trial court 
concluded that the CISG did not apply, and it therefore did 
not instruct the jury on the CISG.380 On appeal Eurosurgical 
argued, among other things, that the trial courts decision 
not to instruct the jury on the CISG was prejudicial error.381
The court of appeal rejected that argument.382
The trial courts conclusion that the CISG did not apply 
to the sales of goods by Eurosurgical to OrthoTec under the 
assignment agreement was based in part on the inclusion of 
 372. Id. at *2. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. at *2. 
 375. Id. at *3. 
 376. See id. at *46. 
 377. See id. at *56. 
 378. Id. at *67. 
 379. See id. at *78. 
 380. Id. at *12. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. 
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a choiceoflaw clause choosing California law, but silent as 
to the application of the CISG, which was included in the 
assignment agreement. However, the trial court did not 
base its conclusion solely on inclusion of the choiceoflaw 
clause on the contrary, the trial court specifically pointed to 
four factors.383 The trial court based its conclusion on 
evidence that (1) the initial draft of the agreement provided 
for application of the CISG (2) [OrthoTecs principal] 
believed potential distributors would be uncomfortable with 
a treaty governing the parties relationship and discussed 
the matter with [one of Eurosurgicals principals] (3) [the 
Eurosurgical principal] agreed to eliminate application of 
the CISG and (4) the final version of the agreement omitted 
any reference to the CISG and provided only for the 
application of California law.384 Based on all of the 
evidence, the trial court determined that the parties 
intended to exclude application of the CISG.385 In making 
that finding, the trial court distinguished the case from 
Asante Technologies, where the parties expressed no clear 
desire to exclude application of the CISG.386
Whether it occurred by accident or by design, this is the 
sort of analysis that a court should conduct under Article 8, 
Section 3 of the CISG when the CISG would otherwise 
apply to a contract but one party argues that the parties 
intended to exclude the CISG and offers evidence showing 
that the parties intended to exclude the CISG. 
The choiceoflaw clause alone does not exclude 
application of the CISG, and, in fact, should give rise to a 
presumption that the CISG is applicable whenever the 
choiceoflaw clause chooses the laws of a state or territory 
within the United States or of another party to the CISG. 
But even so, when a written agreement includes a choiceof
law clause that chooses the laws of a particular state to 
govern the agreement, it is not necessarily the case that the 
CISG must apply. The additional evidence to be considered 
by the court in accordance with Article 8, Section 3 of the 
CISG could lead the court to conclude that the parties 
intended nevertheless to exclude application of the CISG. 
 383. Id. at *12 n.14. 
 384. Id. 
 385. See id. 
 386. Id.
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That kind of analysis, which is required under Article 8, 
appears to be the analysis conducted by the court in 
OrthoTec, even though the court does not appear to have 
acknowledged ostensibly that that is what it was doing. And 
this sort of analysis should occur every time there is a 
contract that would be governed by the CISG, as required 
by Article 8, Section 3, if the parties disagree regarding 
their intent to exclude its application. 
Under the CISG, it is therefore reasonably possible that 
a party to a contract who wishes to exclude application of 
the CISG could present sufficient evidence for the court to 
find that the parties intended to exclude the CISG, 
notwithstanding the failure of the parties to exclude the 
CISG expressly in their written agreement. If a party can 
show that the parties agreed outside the four corners of the 
written agreement to exclude application of the CISG, then 
the CISG should be excluded with respect to all subsequent 
analysis by the court of the dispute.387 Instead of proceeding 
with analysis of the contract dispute under the CISG, the 
court should then use the courts own choiceoflaw rules to 
determine the applicable body of law, and it should do so 
using the principles set forth in Article 8 of the CISG to the 
extent that the courts analysis under its choiceoflaw rules 
requires determining the parties intent. Once the 
applicable body of law is determined by the court, from that 
point forward Article 8 will no longer be relevant.  
Because the contract at issue will always be a contract 
of sale of goods, within the United States the applicable 
 387. The court should not at that point reconsider under the UCC (or other 
applicable body of law) any issues already resolved under the CISG. If the court 
were to conduct a new choiceoflaw analysis under the new body of law, then 
the choiceoflaw analysis under the new body of law could lead to the conclusion 
that the CISG is the applicable body of law (if extrinsic evidence were not 
considered under the other body of law, for example) a return to choice of law 
under the CISG (and a return to permitting extrinsic evidence under Article 8) 
would send the court back to the alternative body of law and there would ensue 
an irresolvable echo effect, causing the court to consider and reconsider the 
question of applicable law ad infinitum. See, e.g., Chateau des Charmes Wines 
Ltd. v. Sabaté USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the 
CISG must be applied to determine whether a contract had formed that 
included a forum selection clause) see also BelcherRobinson, L.L.C. v. Linamar 
Corp., 699 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1335 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (reasoning that the CISG 
must be applied to determine if the parties formed a contract that included a 
forum selection clause excluding application of the CISG). 
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body of law for the contract would very likely be Article 2 of 
the UCC, as adopted by the state where the court hearing 
the claim is located, if that state bears a sufficiently close 
relationship to the performance of the agreement.388
VII. HOPE FOR THE PRACTITIONER
The commercial lawyer who yearns for predictability 
and certainty in helping her client to manage her clients 
crossborder commercial arrangements may understandably 
recoil at the idea that her hard work and diligence in 
carefully crafting a written contract that memorializes her 
clients agreement with a counterparty located in another 
country could be unraveled by a crafty argument that the 
written contract does not represent the true intent of the 
parties. Indeed, that risk exists.389 However, the risk can be 
reduced by taking certain steps.390
First, the drafting by both parties of a comprehensive, 
robust written agreement should minimize the necessity 
and appropriateness of turning to extrinsic evidence to 
determine party intent. Article 8, Section 3s reference to 
all relevant circumstances of the case391 surely includes 
the terms of the written agreement itself. When that 
written agreement is the product of a negotiation and its 
drafting was undertaken by both parties, the written 
agreement arguably offers the very best evidence of the 
parties subjective intent, at least with respect to those 
terms that are addressed in the written agreement. In the 
normal case, it should be given great deference by the court. 
Second, the welldrafted written international 
commercial contract should include a welldrafted express 
choiceoflaw clause, as well as a welldrafted express 
choiceofforum clause, each of which has been carefully 
considered in light of the laws of the jurisdictions where the 
 388. See U.C.C. § 1301(c) (2008), 1 U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 2010) see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971) (amended 1988). 
 389. See supra Part VII.C. 
 390. See generally Peter Winship, Changing Contract Practices in the Light of 
the United Nations Sales Convention: A Guide for Practitioners, 29 INTL LAW. 
525 (1995) (guidance for the practitioner on modifying practices in light of the 
CISG and its terms). 
 391. CISG, supra note 3, art. 8(3). 
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agreement is likely to be enforced (due to the location of the 
parties and their assets). Those clauses should be the result 
of actual agreement by the parties, should be conspicuous, 
and should specifically address application or exclusion of 
the CISG, as discussed in Part V.A, supra. 
Third, the agreement should contain a clear merger 
clause that provides that the terms of the written 
agreement supersede all prior agreements and 
understandings. While a merger clause will not be 
dispositive, especially one that is merely contained in a 
standard form contract that has not been negotiated,392
inclusion of a welldrafted merger clause in a negotiated 
agreement should bolster an argument that extrinsic 
evidence should not prevail over the written agreement.393
In addition, it may be worthwhile specifically to exclude 
Article 8, Section 3 by means of an express clause in the 
written agreement. Such a clause also would not be 
dispositive, as a court would apply an Article 8, Section 3 
analysis to determine whether the parties agreed to exclude 
Article 8, Section 3 and might reach the conclusion that 
they did not actually intend to exclude Article 8, Section 3. 
But if the court finds that the parties did intend to exclude 
Article 8, Section 3, then introduction of extrinsic evidence 
should thereafter be largely, if not entirely, curtailed, except 
to the extent permitted by some other principle of law. 
Similarly, the parties should consider inclusion of a 
clause providing that the written agreement cannot be 
amended or supplemented except in a writing signed by 
both parties. While enforcement of such a clause is limited 
by Article 29 of the CISG,394 it nevertheless should 
contribute to a greater level of confidence on the part of 
third parties that the contracting parties intended the 
written agreement to be given primacy over inconsistent 
extrinsic evidence. 
 392. See TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, No. 00 Civ. 
5189(RCC), 2006 WL 2463537, at *78 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2006). 
 393. Professor Winship has suggested that [p]arties may wish to exclude 
reference to prior negotiations, especially when they fear representations made 
by agents without express authority. Parties may also wish to exclude reference 
to usages of trade because, for example, they may believe usages are uncertain. 
Winship, supra note 390, at 542. 
 394. CISG, supra note 3, art. 29. 
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Fourth, the commercial lawyer should counsel her client 
to be careful to avoid engaging in conduct that belies the 
terms of the written agreement. In order to facilitate 
accomplishing that task, the commercial lawyer and her 
client should work together to confirm that (i) the terms of 
the written agreement actually reflect the allocation of risk, 
rights, and responsibility that has been agreed upon and (ii) 
those terms accurately reflect how the client expects the 
parties to behave. Once performance has commenced, the 
commercial lawyer and her client should be vigilant about 
making sure that any conduct of the parties that is 
inconsistent with that which is required under the written 
agreement is appropriately addressed. How the conduct is 
addressed will depend on the circumstances. For example, it 
could be the case that the conduct is preferable to that 
which is required by the terms of the written agreement, in 
which case a written amendment of the written agreement 
might be desirable. 
The question that the commercial lawyer should always 
consider is, how certain will a disinterested third party 
(such as a court) be that the written agreement actually 
represents the intent of both parties? It seems likely that 
the nature of the written agreement, including how it was 
created and entered into, as well as the scope of its terms, 
will determine that level of certainty. Thus, a set of 
standard terms and conditions that were simply included 
with an order document in the wake of an oral negotiation 
would be viewed with some skepticism. Such a document is 
less likely to reflect bargainedfor terms or the shared 
intent of the parties. On the other hand, a highly negotiated 
agreement that is the result of drafting by both parties and 
that is drafted in a way that accurately reflects the 
expressly agreedupon allocation of risk and responsibility 
between the parties, especially one that is detailed, 
comprehensive and clear, is much more likely to be deemed 
to be a manifestation of the parties actual intent. If such a 
written agreement is entered into, the burden of overcoming 
the terms of that written agreement by means of extrinsic 
evidence under Article 8 should be a very heavy burden 
indeed. 
CONCLUSION
When two or more parties enter into an international 
sale of goods transaction, the crossborder nature of the 
transaction adds layers of complexity in terms of law, 
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language, culture, business practice, and logistics, which 
makes predictability in the arrangement elusive. 
Establishing at the beginning of the relationship the terms 
on which the parties intend to do business helps to reduce 
uncertainty relating to performance obligations, allocation 
of risk and responsibility, and remedies available when 
things go wrong, as they inevitably will from time to time. 
In that regard, it is essential that the body of law that 
governs performance and breach and remedies be 
determinable with reasonable certainty, or the parties are 
left with the untenable dicey atmosphere of . . . a legal no
mans land, which surely will damage the fabric of 
international commerce and trade, and imperil the 
willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into 
international commercial agreements.395
However, as businesspersons are keenly aware, 
businesses do not operate in a riskfree world, and 
international commerce and trade continues to occur in 
enormous volumes. That arguably makes it even more 
important for U.S. courts to avoid contributing 
unnecessarily to the uncertainty in the world of 
international business by improperly or inconsistently 
analyzing and applying the CISG. 
What must the parties do under Article 6 of the CISG to 
exclude application of the CISG? Article 6 requires no 
particular method of exclusion. Contrary to the statements 
of some courts, Article 6 does not require exclusion of the 
CISG to be in writing (Article 11 makes it doubly clear that 
it need not be in writing) and Article 6 does not require 
exclusion to be express. 
What may the parties do under Article 6 of the CISG to 
exclude application of the CISG? Because the CISG does not 
require written exclusion or express exclusion of the CISG, 
it is enough for the parties to intend to exclude application 
of the CISG. And that intent can be demonstrated in 
numerous ways. 
However, because the CISG applies automatically to 
certain contracts unless it is excluded, when the CISG 
applies to a contract pursuant to Article 1 of the CISG, a 
party who desires to exclude its application should bear the 
burden of showing that the parties mutually intended to 
 395. Scherk v. AlbertoCulver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974). 
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exclude its application. If that party fails to carry its 
burden, then the CISG should apply. 
Inclusion of an express choiceoflaw clause that chooses 
the laws of a state within the United States (or of a country 
that is a party to the CISG) but that is silent on the CISG 
should not by itself allow the party to carry its burden of 
proof that the parties intended to exclude the CISG. On the 
contrary, because the law of the selected state includes the 
CISG pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, the choiceoflaw clause provides objective 
evidence that the parties intended the CISG to apply. 
However, whether or not there is a choiceoflaw clause, 
in carrying its burden of proof, the party desiring to exclude 
application of the CISG must be allowed to introduce 
evidence of any and all relevant circumstances showing the 
parties intent to exclude application of the CISG. Such 
evidence could include but is not necessarily limited to the 
negotiations, any practices the parties have established 
between themselves, usages, and the parties conduct. When 
the party desiring to exclude application of the CISG 
introduces such evidence, the court is required by Article 8, 
Section 3 of the CISG to give due consideration to those 
relevant circumstances. In so doing, the court could reach 
the conclusion that the parties intended to exclude 
application of the CISG, even when there is a written 
contract that contradicts that conclusion, provided that the 
court is satisfied that the party desiring to contradict the 
writing has proven that the parties actual intent was 
contrary to the writing, which will be a very steep burden 
indeed. 
This approach is different than the approach taken by 
U.S. courts under the common law and under the UCC, 
where the statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule 
make it much more difficult, if not impossible, to introduce 
such evidence. And it may be difficult for some courts to 
overcome that cultural tradition of affording a position of 
primacy to the written word. But as U.S. courts encounter 
disputes arising from international sale of goods contracts, 
it is imperative that they do so, so that businesspersons can 
determine which body of law governs their transactions. It 
is imperative that they do so, so as to avoid undermining 
the rule of law established by the Supremacy Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution. And it is imperative that they do so, 
because proper application of the CISG is essential for 
ensuring reciprocal treatment by courts located in other 
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countries that have ratified the CISG when U.S. persons 
appear before those courts in a contract dispute that ought 
to be governed by the CISG rather than some unfamiliar, 
foreign body of law. The failure of U.S. courts to apply the 
CISG in lieu of national (or, more accurately, state) law 
invites courts of other countries to disregard the CISG when 
it suits them, in the event that U.S. persons or entities are 
parties to litigation in such courts, thus undermining the 
CISGs goals of uniformity and certainty. 
Instead, U.S. courts must play their part in enforcing 
the body of law that has been adopted by the United States 
and most of its top trading partners with the stated purpose 
of removing legal barriers in and promoting the 
development of international trade.  
